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Conventional wisdom holds that a main constraint to 
reforming the European project is not a shortage of ideas or 
of tools, but a lack of priorities. To put it differently, economists 
have discussed extensively what to do and how, but have 
been broadly silent on who and when. Which institutions 
and rules are needed, and when? This eBook shows that 
such institutional questions, although seldomly raised, are 
of fundamental importance for the future of European 
integration. The individual chapters distil the lessons from 
the institutional framework underpinning Bretton Woods 
and the globalisation wave that followed it. For example, and 
accounting for its prominence, we ask whether a European 
Monetary Fund is sufficient or whether other institutions, 
rules, and agencies are needed, and if so, how these should 
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The debate on reforming Europe in the face of rising economic and political opposition 
is by no means short of ideas on what must be done. But what it does lack is an order 
of priorities of which mechanisms and institutions should be addressed, when, and by 
whom. 
This eBook argues that focusing on institutional questions is of fundamental importance 
for the future of European integration. The authors break down the lessons from the 
Bretton Woods institutional framework, and the wave of globalisation that followed it, to 
ask whether the current institutions and those being proposed – foremost the European 
Monetary Fund – are sufficient, and what others are needed. Ordered in to five sections, 
the eBook analyses European integration in the context of first Bretton Woods and then 
other existing institutions. It also addresses labour mobility and monetary union design, 
before examining the case for redesigning key institutions.
The authors conclude that the European integration project “needs reform and it needs 
it now”, for fear that it may not survive another economic downturn. They recommend 
that we should first think about institutions and their designs, and then how financial 
and fiscal reforms can be designed for greatest impact. In this way, the institutional 
approach they propose naturally complements the one advocated in the recently 
published CEPR Policy Insight no. 91.
CEPR thanks Nauro Campos and Jan-Egbert Sturm for their careful editorship of this 
eBook, and Anil Shamdasani and Sophie Roughton for their excellent production of 
it. CEPR, which takes no institutional positions on economic policy matters, is glad to 
provide a platform for an exchange of views on this topic.
Tessa Ogden
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In most countries on the continent, Europe has become contentious, to put it mildly. 
For good (rather, bad) reasons. The euro area debt crisis came as a shocking surprise; 
the authorities were totally unprepared, and it showed. In the event, the banking 
system has become fragmented, the precise opposite of what the single currency was 
designed to deliver. For more than a decade, the middle classes have stagnated while 
the famous ‘top 1%’ have become much richer. Meanwhile, those at the bottom were 
preserved from the onslaught of globalisation and the shake-up from technological 
change. The immigration crisis has demonstrated the inability of the EU to deal with 
the consequences of freedom of movement. And, of course, Brexit has broken the taboo 
that Europe is a much-desired one-way street. 
Most of these humiliating developments had been, or should have been, anticipated. 
Policymakers chose to ignore warnings. The ‘system’ did not produce the kind of 
critical introspection that is vital for long-term success. When problems surged, the EU 
proved unable to react properly. True, there were innovations, but none is satisfactory 
yet. The Banking Union remains work in progress. The Stability and Growth Pact was 
reformed a few more times to become a machinery of great complexity and limited 
usefulness. Some countries are saddled with huge debts likely to be unsustainable, but 
no official will talk about this risk. Denial and complacency remain the order of the day. 
This is all a failure of European institutions. The editors of this eBook must be 
commended for having brought together an impressive array of authors who focus their 
contributions on institutions. Collectively, they do not offer a blueprint of what has to be 
done, but the disconnect between their analyses and what policymakers debate suggests 
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that, once again, the EU is not ready to take serious remedial action ahead of trouble. 
This eBook should be required reading for all those who care deeply about Europe and, 
especially, for its policymakers.
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1 Europe’s future: The value of 
an institutional economics 
perspective
Nauro F. Campos and Jan-Egbert Sturm
Brunel University London and ETH-Zürich; ETH Zurich
One can no longer be sure whether Europe is just at a crossroads or on the brink. The 
multi-faceted economic crisis has deepened. It has also become a widespread political 
crisis. There is little disagreement that the European integration project needs to be 
reformed and that this needs to be done now, before the next economic downturn. The 
costs of doing nothing are large and rising, and we must think of innovative ways to 
make reform happen in a democratic, efficient, and sustainable manner.
Economists have debated what to do and how but have been mostly silent on who 
and when. Which institutions and rules are needed? In our view, not even asking the 
question, “Which institutions should be redesigned or even created from scratch to 
carry out reform in Europe?”, goes a long way towards explaining why reforms have 
not been implemented. 
This eBook argues that addressing such institutional questions is of fundamental 
importance for the future of European integration. 
The individual chapters distil the lessons from the Bretton Woods institutional 
framework and from the globalisation wave that followed it. The overarching questions 
that motivate the eBook are: Is a European Monetary Fund (EMF) sufficient? Are other 
institutions needed? How should these other institutions be designed and implemented? 
And how should they fit into the existing institutional framework? 
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The eBook is organised into five parts. The first examines the Bretton Woods system 
and European integration. The second looks at prominent European institutions (the 
European Parliament, the Structural Funds, and the ESM). The third focuses on 
financial institutions and on labour mobility. The fourth discusses key monetary union 
institutional aspects. The fifth and final part highlights strategies for, and obstacles to, 
redesigning European institutions. 
Bretton Woods and European integration 
Harold James documents that the idea of a ‘European Monetary Fund’ has been 
around for the last four decades. This shows that the Bretton Woods system, which 
collapsed in the mid-1970s, is a valuable idea for Europe and can potentially provide 
institutional solutions to manage its integration processes. He considers the problems 
to which Bretton Woods-style institutions might be of assistance, chiefly, current 
account imbalances (a German feature throughout except during reunification), debt 
sustainability, conditionality and ownership (which are capabilities developed over 
time by the IMF in terms of debt reduction and structural reforms, respectively), and 
security linkages and leadership. He concludes that a successful EMF would be an 
instrument for strengthening other European institutions, in particular the Council. 
Axel Dreher draws upon research on the operations of the Bretton Woods institutions 
to distil lessons for the design of European institutions. He notes that any new European 
institution will need to ensure its lending operations focus on developmental projects 
and complement (and clearly not substitute) private funding. Given the nature of such 
projects, he suggests an independent panel of evaluation experts to enforce lending 
rules. Lending decisions from a European Monetary Fund need to be guided by strict and 
unambiguous rules that cannot easily be amended due to short-term political interests 
of powerful governments. Without such strict rules and careful scrutiny, Dreher warns 
that an EMF risks ending up providing funds to those who need them the least or those 
that are more politically connected. 
Nicholas Crafts evaluates the economic benefits from European integration using 
the UK’s sojourn. Reviewing the evidence, he argues that the benefit-cost ratio of EU 
membership has been favourable and that these net benefits were mostly driven by 
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strengthening competition in product markets. He notes that the political sustainability 
of these benefits was due to enhanced social safety nets (for example, the rise in social 
transfers as a share of GDP). He stresses the symmetry of this argument with respect 
to the vote for Brexit – the evidence shows that a fairly modest reversal of austerity 
or reduction of fiscal cuts might have been enough to prevent an electoral victory for 
the Leave campaign. Finally, the political and economic deterioration in the UK since 
the referendum could serve as an argument against leaving, especially at a difficult 
time when some recently formed European governments face the need for reforms in 
Europe.
Giuseppe Bertola argues that the European integration project can only be properly 
understood from a political economy perspective. From the outset, it has been 
based on close and intricate links between its economic-monetary and political-
security aspects. A key lesson is that Europe has to rely on trust and self-enforcing 
cooperative behaviour. Achieving a cooperative equilibrium may actually be easier 
when members are heterogeneous across various dimensions and the Union itself has 
multiple complementary purposes, making it possible to negotiate compromises across 
different policy areas over time. Brexit and other nationalistic political sentiments have 
challenged this mode of operation, which has in the past proved capable of discouraging 
opportunistic behaviour and preventing open conflict. If properly understood and 
reformed, it can continue to foster trust and cooperation in the future.  
Harald Badinger provides a critical perspective on the debate on the future institutions 
of Europe. He argues that the severity of the moral hazard problem and the desirability 
of risk sharing are central. From the five scenarios in the Commission’s 2017 White 
Paper on the Future of Europe, he argues that two are most deserving of consideration: 
doing less more efficiently, and doing much more together. He argues that these options 
are incompatible because of theoretical reasons that for different policy fields there 
should be different optimal levels of centralisation. There are policy areas with positive 
net benefits from centralisation (that is, where doing more together is justified), such as 
migration, security, defence, competition, and environment. However, for most policy 
areas theory gives less guidance about the optimal degree of integration.  
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European institutions
Since the first elections in 1979, the European Parliament has become a powerful 
institution. Simon Hix, Abdul Noury and Gerard Roland study how its workings 
have changed recently. They document that the Parliament has experienced a shift away 
from the traditional left-right divide towards a new cleavage between anti-globalisation 
(mostly on the extreme right and extreme left) and pro-globalisation. In the Parliament, 
this takes the form of a pro- and anti-EU cleavage. This became evident in the 2009 
Parliament, and even more so in the 2014 Parliament. They show that for some policy 
issues – such as employment, environment, gender, and the internal market – the left-
right cleavage is still powerful. For others – such as budget, economic and monetary 
affairs, foreign affairs, and international trade – the pro/anti-EU dimension now 
dominates. 
Sascha Becker, Peter Egger, and Maximilian von Ehrlich analyse structural funding 
operations. The main goal of such transfers is to foster the convergence of fiscal 
capacity and, ultimately, of per capita income. They argue that, on average, the scheme 
is effective in terms of per-capita income growth. Yet, its employment effects are hard 
to detect and there is evidence of a crowding out of private investment. They also 
document that the scheme is least effective in poor regions with low levels of absorptive 
capacity (e.g. low levels of human capital). Since the crisis, structural funds operations 
have worked differently: effects on per-capita income growth have been smaller than 
before the crisis, while the effects on employment have been larger. Finally, the authors 
find the scheme triggers positive per-capita income growth effects relatively quickly, 
but the effects do not seem permanent. 
Kari Korhonen offers a history of one of the newest, less well-known and yet most 
influential European institutions, namely, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
In 2017, member states agreed to focus on two issues for the June 2018 summit: 
completing the Banking Union and transforming the ESM into a European Monetary 
Fund. The ESM and its predecessor (the European Financial Stability Facility) were 
put in place in response to the financial crisis. With a lending capacity of €500 billion 
(compared to the IMF’s $750 billion), the ESM is the largest of the regional financing 
arrangements, operating mostly with front-loaded loan programmes, at lower rates and 
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longer maturities than the IMF. Korhonen shows how the ESM has acquired various 
new tasks over time and how it has developed closer coordination with other institutions 
(for example, a cooperation agreement with the European Commission in April 2018). 
Financial institutions and labour mobility 
Isabel Schnabel and Christian Seckinger argue that the disintegration of the 
European banking sector experienced after the global financial crisis was at least partly 
triggered by regulatory intervention and was highly costly. Policy measures fostering 
disintegration in crisis times are harmful because they destroy a key mechanism for 
risk sharing when, particularly in a currency union, it is needed most. They show that 
the presence of foreign banks via branches and subsidiaries is particularly important 
to buffer the adverse effects of domestic financial constraints. Therefore, promoting 
financial integration should be high on the political agenda of European policymakers. 
A special focus should be put on promoting resilient capital flows, which implies 
favouring equity over debt, long-term over short-term debt, and retail over wholesale 
funds.
Mathias Hoffmann, Egor Maslov, Bent Sørensen and Iryna Stewen postulate that 
cross-border interbank lending is not sufficient to have better risk sharing. Following 
the crisis, this type of banking integration was quickly reversed and thereby actually 
exacerbated macroeconomic asymmetries among euro area countries. As can be 
seen from state-level banking deregulation in the US in the 1980s, deep cross-border 
integration is highly desirable, either through direct cross-border lending of banks 
to firms and households or through cross-border consolidation of banks. It improves 
the access of bank-dependent firms to credit, making it easier for firms to finance 
investment and wage payments, and making labour income and investment less sensitive 
to asymmetric productivity shocks. However, as firm profits become more volatile, this 
makes further capital market integration more important. 
Chris House, Christian Proebsting and Linda Tesar draw upon model-based 
simulations to show that differences in austerity across countries can account for 
roughly two-thirds of the observed variation in GDP after the crisis. Most countries cut 
government spending, and those that cut this most experienced the sharpest declines in 
Bretton Woods, Brussels and Beyond: Redesigning the Institutions of Europe
6
output, leading to increased debt-to-GDP ratios. Although in European countries there 
is a net inflow of workers when unemployment is relatively low, this effect is roughly 
three times larger in the US. If Europeans were as mobile as Americans, their model 
simulations show that the variation in unemployment rates across euro area countries 
would have declined by almost 40%. A similar result emerges under flexible exchange 
rates while keeping labour mobility low. Hence, the authors conclude that labour 
mobility can operate as a substitute for floating exchange rates. 
Davide Furceri and Prakash Loungani discuss labour mobility within Europe in 
comparison to that in the US. Even before the introduction of the euro, many economists 
warned that the lack of this potential adjustment mechanism could endanger the 
effectiveness of the currency union. The evidence they amass shows a convergence of 
adjustment processes in Europe and the US, reflecting both a fall in interstate migration 
in the US and a rise in its role in Europe. Within Europe, the role of migration as 
a shock absorber is considerably larger for Central and Eastern European than for 
Western European countries. Overall, mobility has picked up since the financial and 
euro area crises and has thereby played an important role in labour market adjustments. 
Yet migration has run into strong political headwinds. Recipient countries threaten with 
barriers, despite ample evidence on the economic benefits of migration.
Monetary and fiscal union 
Jakob De Haan and Patrick Kosterink argue that fiscal discipline is a necessary 
precondition for national fiscal policy to play a role in the stabilisation of both 
idiosyncratic and common shocks. The need for fiscal risk sharing hinges on the 
relevance of idiosyncratic shocks and the potency of national fiscal policy to stabilise 
the effects thereof. If governments ensure sustainability of fiscal policy, they can 
use national fiscal policy to stabilise idiosyncratic shocks (which have become less 
important than in the past). Under those conditions, fiscal risk sharing beyond that in the 
Banking Union is probably not needed. Coordination of monetary and national fiscal 
policies, on the other hand, may support the monetary policy of the ECB to stabilise 
common shocks. This would only be feasible after current levels of government debt 
have been reduced to sustainable levels.
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Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji argue that financial engineering cannot cure the 
fundamental instability in the euro area sovereign bond markets that is created by 
national governments issuing debt in a currency that is not their own. Recent proposals 
to create a safe asset through engineering ‘sovereign bond-backed securities’ (SBBSs) 
cannot work because this does not eliminate national government bond markets and 
thereby the potential for destabilising capital flows across borders. As the senior 
tranche of the SBBSs will also consist of national bonds that investors want to dump, it 
is unlikely that these can maintain their status of a safe asset in times of crisis. Investors 
will flee the senior tranches to invest in what they then consider super-safe national 
sovereign bonds. Real stabilisation can only be achieved through a backstop of the ECB 
and the introduction of Eurobonds based on joint liability of the participating national 
governments. 
Philippe Martin notes that the European fiscal rules have allowed for too lax a 
policy during good times and forced too much austerity during crisis. Stronger rules 
on the financial architecture and more effective fiscal rules are needed. Furthermore, 
the financial and economic costs of sovereign debt restructuring, which must remain 
a last resort option inside the euro area, need to be reduced. This can increase the 
credibility of the no-bailout rule, allow for more fiscal flexibility because of more fiscal 
responsibility, and reduce the pressure on the ECB to intervene. Creating fiscal capacity 
at the EU level to help countries facing large negative shocks would also prevents a 
situation whereby the ECB is the sole institution capable of providing macroeconomic 
stimulus. Such a fiscal architecture is to be seen as a complement to, and not a substitute 
for, the other elements, in particular regarding the financial architecture. 
There is a strong push towards a fiscal union. Lars Feld argues that fiscal competences 
of the EU should be introduced after its transition into a democratic federal system 
with sufficiently well-developed legal control. The euro crisis has made clear that 
national responsibility for fiscal policy is not sustainable unless the doom loop between 
banks and sovereigns eases. Therefore, the completion of a Banking Union is needed. 
However, the proposals towards a fiscal union induce strong moral hazard problems. For 
instance, the introduction of a rainy-day fund reduces willingness to reform as it rests 
on the fiction that the consequences of economic shocks are independent from labour 
or product market institutions, and national policies. Furthermore, a precautionary 
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credit line of the ESM is problematic, because it depends on the enforcement of ex ante 
conditionality. The European track record in complying with fiscal rules does not raise 
confidence that this scheme will work properly.
Redesigning euro area institutions 
Xavier Vives argues that the attempt to impose fiscal and market discipline through 
the Maastricht Treaty and Stability and Growth Pact has failed. The game now is to 
find a solution in which countries remain sovereign and engage in risk sharing, while 
maintaining market discipline in order to control moral hazard. When countries can 
suffer runs on their sovereign debt denominated in a currency they do not control, an 
international lender of last resort may be required. It can avoid self-fulfilling crisis 
and excessive liquidation of entrepreneurial projects while at the same time impose 
discipline-enforcing restructuring policies when the danger of moral hazard is high. 
The European Monetary Fund could build a sufficient amount of risk sharing while 
keeping market discipline. The EMF should then be responsible for liquidity and 
solvency problems of countries, allowing the ECB to concentrate on liquidity help for 
banks in need and on monetary policy. 
Clemens Fuest agrees that while financial stability and resilience to economic shocks 
require risk sharing, hard budget constraints and sufficient incentives for sound policies 
need to be preserved. Instead of being substitutes, these may actually be complements: 
more diversification in government debt holdings of banks reduces the costs of debt 
restructuring and improves market discipline. A lack of trust between member states 
and in European institutions does not appear to allow that view. Trust grows with 
the experience of successful common undertakings in areas such as defence, border 
protection, migration, as well as research and education that offer huge opportunities 
for adding value over and above what individual member states can achieve. However, 
relying on current institutions until trust has grown is risky. Reforms with a balanced 
combination of improved risk sharing and more market discipline – such as the 
European safe asset proposal or the development of the ESM into a European Monetary 
Fund – offer the chance to reduce the cost of the next crisis significantly. 
Europe’s future: The value of an institutional economics perspective
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What have we learned and what should we do next? 
The Bretton Woods agreement set up new institutions: the World Bank and IMF (both 
operational by 1950), and an International Trade Organisation that only came into being 
in the 1990s (as the WTO). The European integration project was launched in this 
context. When the Bretton Woods system started to wane in the late 1960s, Europe 
looked for new solutions (for example, the 1969 Werner Report on monetary union). 
The Single Market Act was a response to the Eurosclerosis of the 1970s and 1980s. The 
1990s saw waves of globalisation and integration that the 2007 financial crisis stopped 
in their tracks. Monetary integration progressed so that, whenever and in whichever 
form Brexit occurs, for practical purposes the euro area will become the European 
Union. The US recovered from the 2007 crisis while Europe suffered a second double-
dip setback in 2011. The future of Europe has been in check ever since. 
Yet a severe omission in the future of Europe debate, in our view, is that the institutional 
question has not been raised. It must be. Thinking about ‘who’ may unlock the difficulties 
in compromising on ‘what’ and ‘when’. We studied a few selected institutions above, 
but this list was not exhaustive and there are many we have not touched upon, such as 
labour market institutions (Blanchard 2018).  An institutional map of Europe should be 
a priority for future research.  
The European integration project needs reform and it needs it now. The next economic 
downturn may have severe political and economic consequences if it finds Europe 
unprepared. The costs of doing nothing are enormous. We must be creative, determined, 
and able to implement the needed reforms in a democratic, efficient, and sustainable 
manner. 
How does the ‘institutional approach’ compare with others in the future of Europe 
debate? The main difficulty in answering this lies in the multitude of different proposals, 
suggestions, and policies that have emerged in the last five years or so. Indeed, the 
European Parliament has created a website that tracks such proposals and prepared a 
report comparing them (European Parliament 2018a, 2018b). Yet the most important 
proposal in our view is that from the ‘7+7’ French and German economists (Bénassy-
Quéré et al. 2018), many of which kindly contributed to this volume. Their proposal 
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encompasses reforms of the financial, fiscal, and institutional architectures. In our 
opinion, the reform of the institutional architecture should receive greater priority and 
greater weight and should have been fleshed out more ambitiously. 
We are aware this eBook cannot fully address the many issues surrounding the 
institutional question of how to design a new framework for the European integration 
project. We are convinced, however, that if it succeeds in raising and adding these issues 
to the current debate on the future of Europe, our task has been accomplished.
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Europe has long had a Bretton Woods fixation. Bretton Woods created both an 
international monetary system with rules, designed to maintain an open trading regime, 
and an institution to arbitrate and enforce those rules, the IMF. After the breakdown 
of the ‘Bretton Woods system’, with fixed but adjustable exchange rates, in the early 
1970s, France and Germany tried to find an equivalent on a European level. In 1978 an 
initiative by President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt led to 
the creation of a European Monetary System (EMS), with fixed but adjustable exchange 
rates, and the agreement provided for the establishment of a European Monetary Fund 
(EMF) within two years. But in practice, the opposition of the German Bundesbank 
meant that nothing came of the initiative, and time simply passed over the two-year 
provision. In the 1990s, after the middle of turmoil in the EMS, the idea of an EMF was 
revived by some academics (Buiter et al. 1998). In spring 2010, as Europe struggled 
with Greek debt the idea came back again (Gros and Mayer 2010, Corsetti and James 
2010). Wolfgang Schäuble, the German Finance Minister, was a major enthusiast for 
this idea, and he came back to the proposal at the end of his term of office. But the 
question has also generated substantial pushback, along the lines that it would take a 
long time to build the technical competence of the IMF in a European setting, and that 
the whole exercise would increase rather than reduce moral hazard (Wyplosz 2017).
The case for a European version of the IMF is relatively simple. First, the IMF follows 
established procedures. This reduces moral hazard, and erodes the assumption that 
a country can, just by letting matters slip and getting into a bad situation, trigger a 
costly international rescue operation. It minimises the possibility of adopting arbitrary 
ad hoc decisions. Second, the attraction of an IMF programme lies in taking some of 
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the political sting out of support operations. In the mid-1990s, for instance, a purely 
bilateral support operation by the US for Mexico would have revived memories of 
a century-old history of US interventions. The first two arguments, however, might 
be thought to suggest that Europe could just leave matters to the IMF, and that no 
new institution is required. Thus it is the actual experience of the euro area crisis that 
drives the search for a regional institution. Relations between the three members of the 
‘troika’ – the IMF, the European Commission, and the ECB – had become strained and 
politicised, and it became tempting to think that Europeans might after all want to act 
on their own. Moreover, there may be a greater wariness of global institutions because 
of perceptions that the US has become unpredictable.
I will consider problems to which Bretton Woods-style institutions might offer a 
solution. The first three are technical-economic in nature, the final one is concerned 
with political economy:
• Current account imbalances
• Debt sustainability
• Conditionality and ownership
• Security linkages and leadership
Current account imbalances
The first rationale for a new institution looks back to the original intentions behind the 
Bretton Woods architecture. The question of adjustment in the international financial 
system has always been contentious, and the debate about international order at Bretton 
Woods was shaped by lessons drawn from the unsuccessful attempt to create a stable 
order after WWI. Originally, Keynes wanted both deficit and surplus countries to pay 
charges to a bank that would act as a credit cooperative. Both would be under equal 
pressure to adjust. That never looked as if it was acceptable to Americans. 
The issue of large surpluses has always – at least for 50 years – played a role in the 
European debate. Other European countries often worried about what they sometimes 
described as Germany’s currency manipulation, which they saw as a mercantilist 
strategy of securing permanent trade and current account surpluses that would give 
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Germany a commanding control of resources. In each phase of European monetary 
integration, Germany’s partners in consequence tried to devise an institutional 
mechanism to control German surpluses, and they believed that an institutional move 
to Europeanisation would admirably do that job. It was the surge in German trade 
surpluses in the late 1960s that drove the original discussion of a European monetary 
union that culminated in the 1970 Werner Plan. In the later 1970s, angst about the 
German surpluses re-emerged and produced the EMS initiatives. In the late 1980s, the 
increase in the German surpluses pushed both the US at the G7 level and France at the 
European level to produce schemes for control. There is a path from Edouard Balladur’s 
proposals to the Delors Committee to the Maastricht Treaty. Only in the 1990s were 
there no German surpluses – that was the consequence of German unification. German 
surpluses in the later 2000s formed the background to much of the discussion of the 
euro area architecture. 
The IMF, while it has often provided excellent analysis of imbalances on a global level, 
has never really found a satisfactory way of addressing the issue. An attempt in 2007 
to strengthen exchange rate regime surveillance ran into the sands, because of Chinese 
opposition and then because of the outbreak of the Global Crisis. In a European setting, 
imbalances could only be really dealt with successfully by more extensive coordination 
of fiscal policies, and it is hard to see that the analytical side of an EMF would have the 
political heft to tackle the issue.
Figure 1 Sum of current account balances,1960-2010 (share of GDP) 
 
Source: James (2012); data from OECD Economic Outlook; European Commission, BIS Annual Macro Economic database.
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Debt sustainability
The second point relates to the more recent experience of the IMF. Over recent decades, 
it developed a substantial competence in debt management and sustainability. Many of 
the influential current proposals for the operation of the EMF (e.g. Weder di Mauro and 
Zettelmayer 2017) suggest an automatic principle of debt reduction as part of a country 
programme. If that proposal were to be realised, Europe would offer a model for how 
to fix a problem that is actually global in scope – and one that is likely to become more 
intense, as the pressures of political populism lead countries to run larger deficits again. 
There are substantial risks, however, that an absolutely automatic approach to debt 
restructuring could trigger creditor runs in times of general financial stress.
Ownership and conditionality
Over time, the Fund evolved an approach to the politics of economic reform that made 
it uncomfortable with the enforcer or whipping boy role that it had traditionally been 
given by the international community (i.e. the big and powerful states). Since the 1990s 
it increasingly emphasised ‘ownership’ – reforms do not work unless they are carried 
by a deep political and social consensus. But the idea of the Europeans in calling in the 
Fund in the debt crisis was precisely to find a substitute for the lacking consensus about 
economic reform.
The most problematical aspect of the troika arrangements was not so much the presence 
of the IMF, but the way that the central bank – a non-political and technocratic institution 
– was pushed into making political choices. Thus the ECB was drawn deeper into 
political arguments. The most obvious turning point was the two letters sent by President 
Jean-Claude Trichet in August 2011 demanding fiscal reform in Italy and Spain, as 
well as a broad range of other conditions. In 2012 the new President Mario Draghi 
gave a spectacular promise to save the euro, the implementation of which involved the 
prospect of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), purchases of government bonds in 
the secondary market, with a formal framework of “strict and effective conditionality”.
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The key to the effectiveness of the ECB’s monetary promise lay in the extent to which it 
had – and was believed by the markets to have – the backing of the German government. 
IMF participation was also crucial for the design of a country programme. In this case, 
the lack of clarity about where, how, and why the ultimate decisions would be taken 
looked like both a problem of leadership and a problem of democratic accountability. 
Security issues
The politics of support for a broad array of economic reforms may raise issues different 
to those generated in a purely economic analysis. Bretton Woods was designed as a 
multilateral and multipolar system, the expression of the wartime coalition (the United 
Nations), in which security and economic stabilisation were joined at the hip. Today 
Europe has its own non-economic vulnerability. The nature of the European problem 
was transformed in 2014-15, first by the Russian occupation of the Crimea and the 
fighting in eastern Ukraine, and then in 2015 by the large-scale inflow of refugees 
from Syria, but also from other areas. At first it looked as if the new shocks would 
prove fatal to the European idea; then some people came to believe that the older debt 
issue was more easily solved in the context of multiple challenges. Brexit and Trump 
only increased that impression, and Europe – especially after the election of Emmanuel 
Macron as President of the French Republic – mobilised to produce a response. It looked 
as if it was having a ‘leadership moment’, analogous to that taken so spectacularly by 
the US at Bretton Woods.
Leadership works by translating between different understandings and different interests 
– or between a vision and its practical realisation. As in the case of the global system, 
management cannot come from one country alone, as that would not be legitimate. 
Multilateral institutions are ways of both diffusing leadership, and of making real 
leadership effective. But their role needs to be precisely defined. They can establish 
greater trust by monitoring commitment, assessing the viability and the sustainability 
of promises. This is precisely the role of “delegated monitor” envisaged by Jean Tirole 
(2002).
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Conclusions 
A Bretton Woods-style institution in Europe could facilitate – through the technical 
advice it gives on debt, on reform proposals, and on market conditions – a stronger 
framework for policy discussion. But because much of the assessment will focus on 
cross-border effects and linkages, there is no reason to think that this task is better 
done at a regional than at a global level. On the other hand, the resources raised for 
programme interventions might well be local, and this is where the developing of the 
ESM mechanism will be helpful. The fundamental trade-offs and the assessment and 
calculation of the appropriate response to strategic risks can only be made at the political 
level. That requires a strengthening of the European institutions, and in particular of the 
Council. The EMF would be an instrument, but it could and should not be expected to 
be the engine of the revolution.
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World Bank operations: Lessons 




The IMF and the World Bank Group are governed by their member countries. Daily 
business is delegated to their Executive Boards, with directors representing countries 
or, in most cases, groups of countries. Of course, not all countries are equal – some 
are more equal than others. So-called weighted voting governs the organisations, 
largely determined by the constellation of power after WWII, and only broadly in line 
with countries’ economic power. The resulting vote share of the US, the single largest 
shareholder of both organisations, exceeds 17% in the IMF (and is of similar magnitude 
in the World Bank). Japan and China follow, with around 6% each, then Germany, the 
UK, and France. Most decisions require a majority of more than 50% (though in the 
IMF formal votes are rarely taken), giving these few countries a substantial say in the 
organisations’ lending decisions.
Observers of IMF and World Bank lending patterns might be surprised to learn about 
these organisations’ primary goals. The Bank aims to “to end extreme poverty by 2030 
and boost shared prosperity in every developing country” while the “IMF’s primary 
purpose is to ensure the stability of the international monetary system”. Still, the World 
Bank mainly finances projects in middle income countries, many of which substitute 
for private capital and only vaguely contribute to development. Most starkly, this 
holds for the private sector arm of the World Bank Group – the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). Among the ‘development’ projects the IFC has financed are the 
five-star Mövenpick Hotel in Ghana’s capital Accra and the expansion of a German 
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supermarket chain (Lidl) in Eastern Europe. The IMF extends loans to some (poor) 
countries on an almost permanent basis (Easterly 2005) and to other (rich) countries for 
reasons that are hardly justifiable based on economic considerations alone (such as the 
very large loans to countries with obviously unsustainable debt).
The importance of political interests of Bank and Fund shareholders for these 
organisations’ lending decisions can be illustrated along a number of dimensions. First, 
consider the election of its president and managing director, respectively. If you hope 
that filling the top jobs is mainly according to qualification, you will be disappointed. 
First of all, it’s about politics. Traditionally, Europeans nominate the managing director 
of the IMF, while the president of the World Bank is an American in return. EU leaders 
first agree on a common candidate for the top job at the Fund. If the candidate is 
acceptable to the US, she will be it. The EU has a total of a voting share of about 30% 
in the Executive Board, the electoral body, so that in tandem with the US – and voting 
by simple majority – the common candidate can be easily enforced. The US gets its 
preferred candidate elected at the Bank in turn.
Second, Bank and Fund credits and loans frequently go to countries with irresponsible 
economic policies. The disbursement of loans is formally linked to conditions, designed 
to better these policies. Politically well-connected countries can, however, risk breaking 
the conditions without losing access to the money. Again, the decision about whether to 
disburse the next tranche of money will be made by the Executive Board, which means 
that the G7 countries and especially the US have the final say. Fund and Bank clients 
where these important member countries have some stakes will not lose access to the 
loans – even if Fund and Bank staff would wish otherwise.
Third, countries that are important for major shareholders have a higher probability of 
receiving funding in the first place, with better conditions. As one example, temporary 
members of the United Nations Security Council get better terms (Dreher et al. 2009a, 
2009b, 2015). We have calculated how often countries have received IMF loans if they 
were a member of the UN Security Council or not (see Figure 1).
It turns out that membership on the Security Council increases the likelihood of 
obtaining an IMF programme by 6 percentage points. This probability increases even 
before a country is elected, as it is often known several years in advance whether a 
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country will be elected to the Council. Immediately after leaving the Security Council 
the frequency with which countries are under an IMF programme falls. The picture 
looks similar for the Bank (Dreher et al. 2009b).
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Note: The horizontal line shows the average IMF participation rate across the entire sample. The dots reflect the results where 
only low- and lower-middle-income countries are included.
Source: Dreher et al. (2009a).
The results of my studies with Jan-Egbert Sturm and James Vreeland show that 
temporary Security Council members not only receive more loans, but that they receive 
them on better terms than non-members. They get higher loan amounts when they 
vote more often with the US in the Council, and smaller loans otherwise (Vreeland 
and Dreher 2014). These results hold if we control in a statistical model for other 
influences on lending. They suggest that the US used the Fund and Bank to support 
their geopolitical interests. A 2006 study by two US economists (Kuziemko and Werker 
2006) showed that bilateral loans from the US go rapidly upwards once a country is 
elected to the Security Council. The US uses its foreign aid to influence voting in the 
Security Council, and applies its influence in the IMF and the World Bank to support 
this goal.
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Another example of the importance of political influence in the IMF are its economic 
forecasts. These are systematically too optimistic with regards to economic growth 
(Dreher et al. 2008). Inflation forecasts for countries that vote in the UN General 
Assembly with the US more often get better forecasts than others, on average. This 
result further highlights the importance of political horse-trading: positive forecasts 
in return for votes at the General Assembly. Turning to the World Bank, the countries 
with direct representation on the Executive Board receive larger loans (Kaja and Werker 
2010, Morrison 2013). This even holds for IFC lending to the private sector, where the 
joint interests of the companies implementing the project (which are mostly from high-
income countries) and the government of the country where the project is executed 
distort the allocation of funding away from purely developmental projects (Dreher and 
Richert 2017).
The lending patterns of the IMF and the World Bank offer valuable advice for the design 
of European institutions. Designed to foster development and alleviate temporary 
balance-of-payments disequilibria, the organisations have changed tremendously 
over time, following their own institutional interests but also the short-term political 
considerations of their major shareholders. With respect to development lending, any 
new institution would need to make sure that lending is indeed additional to private 
funding, rather than merely substituting it, and would focus on projects that are truly 
developmental. Given that such projects are typically riskier and less profitable, such 
rules should be enforced by an independent panel of experts who evaluate each project 
application. Regarding the transformation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
to a ‘European Monetary Fund’, lending decisions need to be guided by strict and 
unambiguous rules for access that cannot easily be amended due to short-term political 
interests of powerful governments. For example, changes to the rules should need the 
unanimous agreement of the member countries of the ‘EMF’ and any member should 
hold the right to test the Fund’s lending decisions in court. Without strict rules, any 
European Bank or Fund will likely follow the examples of their global sister institutions 
and provide the bulk of funds to those who need it least (or are best connected to those 
who hold power).
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4	 The	economic	benefits	from	
European integration: Lessons 
from the UK’s EU sojourn
Nicholas Crafts
University of Warwick
The UK joined the European Economic Community (EEC) late and is about to leave the 
EU early after a temporary stay of 46 years.  Entry into the EEC brought substantial net 
economic benefits, while Brexit will almost certainly entail significant net economic 
costs.  Moreover, if the UK wants to leave even though it is economically harmful 
to do so, presumably other countries may seek to follow the same path.  So, what 
can be learnt from the UK’s experience that may be helpful in guarding against future 
European economic disintegration?
The UK became a member of the EEC in 1973 at the end of the ‘Golden Age’ of 
European economic growth (1950-73) during which labour productivity in the EU15 
had grown at an average rate of 4.9% per year.  The evidence suggests that European 
economic growth was boosted in these years by trade liberalisation which raised the 
long-run income level.  Using a gravity model, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995) 
estimated that intra-EEC trade among the original six members was increased by 3.2% 
t per year between 1956 and 1973, implying that membership of the EEC may have 
raised income levels by 4% to 8% by 1970 (Eichengreen and Boltho 2008).  The total 
long-term effect of post-1950 reductions in trade protection, including reduction of 
external tariffs through GATT, raised European income levels by nearly 20% by the 
mid-1970s, according to the estimates in Badinger (2005).
The postwar reconstruction of the international economy saw economic integration 
restricted by controls on international capital flows (the ‘Bretton-Woods Compromise’). 
The idea of the ‘Bretton-Woods compromise’ was to sacrifice some aspects of economic 
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integration to provide sufficient policy space to make saving the remaining aspects – 
in this case, moving back to freer trade – politically acceptable. This can be seen as a 
choice within the ‘political trilemma’ posited by Rodrik (2000), reproduced in Figure 
1, which states that it is generally only possible to have at most two of the following: 
deep economic integration, democratic politics, and the nation state.  
Figure 1 The Rodrik trilemma
The political trilemma of the world economy (Rodrik 2000)
Deep economic 
integration






Pick two, any two
The policy space was used to underpin acceptance of greater openness by developing 
much better social safety nets (see Table 1) in line with the analysis in Rodrik (1998).
The success of the EEC encouraged other countries to join.  The synthetic-controls 
analysis by Campos et al. (2014) suggests that accession generally raised the long-
run level of income appreciably (Table 2), presumably through reduced trade costs 
and increased trade volumes which raised productivity.  The gain for the UK after ten 
years is estimated to have been 8.6% of GDP.  A similar estimate is obtained by using 
gravity-model estimates of the trade impact and an estimated elasticity of income 
to trade (Crafts 2017).  This is much larger than any reasonable estimate of the ‘EU 
membership fee’ that the UK has paid.  The main components of this fee are budgetary 
transfers, notably including the costs of the Common Agricultural Policy and costs of 
badly designed regulations, which have typically amounted to 0.5% and 0.9% of GDP, 
respectively (Crafts 2016). The benefit-cost ratio of EU membership has been very 
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favourable.  A substantial part of the benefits accrued from strengthening competition 
in product markets, which was a key part of the Thatcher reforms as was underlined by 
strong UK support for the Single Market Act of 1986.1
Table 1 Social transfers (% of GDP)
1930 1960 1980 2005 2013 “2030”
Austria 1.2 15.9 22.6 27.1 28.3 33.3
Belgium 0.6 13.1 23.5 26.5 30.7 37.0
Denmark 3.1 12.3 25.2 27.7 30.8 33.7
Finland 3.0   8.8 18.4 26.2 30.5 36.2
France 1.0 13.4 20.8 30.1 33.0 35.8
Germany 4.8 18.1 23.0 27.3 26.2 30.1
Greece 0.1 10.4 11.5 21.1 22.0 24.8
Ireland 3.7   8.7 17.4 16.0 21.6 25.3
Italy 0.1 13.1 18.0 24.9 28.4 30.4
Netherlands 1.0 11.7 24.1 18.1 24.3 29.4
Norway 2.4   7.8 16.9 21.6 22.9 28.0
Portugal 0.0 10.8 23.0 26.4 29.1
Spain 0.1 15.5 21.1 27.4 30.3
Sweden 2.6 10.8 28.6 29.1 28.6 31.2
Switzerland 1.2   4.9 13.9 20.3 19.1 23.3
UK 2.2 10.2 16.6 20.5 23.8 26.2
Note: “2030” adds to the 2013 figure increases through 2030 from health and long-term care in the absence of cost 
containment (de la Maisonneuve and Oliveira Martins 2013) and from pensions expenditure (OECD 2013)
1 As Leader of the Opposition, Mrs Thatcher was a very strong advocate of staying in the EEC during the UK referendum 
of June 1975.  Only in the late 1980s did she become a Eurosceptic.
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Table 2 Post-accession differences between the level of actual and synthetic GDP 
per person (%)
After five years After ten years
Denmark 10.3 14.3
Ireland   5.2   9.4
United Kingdom   4.8   8.6
Greece -11.6 -17.3
Portugal 11.7 16.5
Spain   9.3 13.7
Austria   4.5   6.4
Finland   2.2   4.0
Sweden   0.8   2.4
Source: Campos et al. (2014)
Several papers have estimated the long-term economic impact of Brexit in terms of 
a levels effect on GDP, and their results are summarised in Ebell and Warren (2016). 
The methodology is typically based on a gravity model estimate of the trade effects 
of various alternatives to EU membership, with the trade effect then converted into an 
impact on GDP.  Not surprisingly, the impacts depend on what replaces EU membership, 
with larger losses the ‘harder’ the Brexit.  Reverting to WTO rules is typically reckoned 
to cost nearly 8% of GDP; much of the gains that EU membership has brought might be 
lost.  On these estimates, the benefit-cost ratio of Brexit does not look promising – this 
is a very expensive way to save a net budgetary contribution of about 0.5% of GDP.
Some caveats to these conclusions should be noted.  First, the gravity-model evidence 
does not explicitly cover the case of a former EU member.  History does seem to 
influence trade volumes and, implicitly, trade costs (Eichengreen and Irwin 1998). 
This suggests that the adverse impact on trade may be lower than the conventional 
calculations assume.2  Second, the post-entry trade effect on productivity that the UK 
experienced in the 1970s and 1980s came largely from increased competition at a time 
2 An interesting example is the ending in 1979 of the long-standing currency union between Ireland and the UK. 
Econometric analysis suggests that this had no effect at all on trade (Thom and Walsh 2002) even though, on balance, the 
literature predicts that a significant reduction was to be expected.
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when this addressed a major weakness in supply-side policy.  Brexit will probably 
not have an equal and opposite effect.  The UK has addressed some of its problems 
of corporate governance and industrial relations, and it has a much more effective 
competition policy regime.  
If Brexit were necessary to allow radical changes to policies which affect the growth 
rate, then an economic case in favour might be made.  After all, there is much that 
could be done to improve UK supply-side policy, for example in the areas of education, 
infrastructure, innovation, and the tax system.  However, reforms are not precluded by 
EU membership.  The obstacles to better policy lie in Westminster, not Brussels, and 
are related to British politics rather than constraints imposed by the EU.  Whereas 40 
years ago entry into the EU did help to improve supply-side policy by strengthening 
competition, today there is no problem area to which Brexit is required to provide an 
answer.
So, if at the macroeconomic level EU membership has been economically highly 
beneficial and Brexit will be costly, why did Leave win the referendum vote?  Three 
big points deserve to be highlighted.  First, while the costs of the UK’s net budgetary 
contribution are a ‘fact’, the costs of reduced trade are opaque to the person in the 
street and are, in any case, an estimate which can be portrayed as unreliable.  Second, 
EU membership entails acceptance of the free movement of labour, but a significant 
proportion of the British electorate want to ‘take back control’ of immigration.  Analysis 
of survey evidence by Goodwin and Milazzo (2017) found that if a voter thought Brexit 
would reduce immigration the probability of a vote to leave was increased by 0.5, that 
80% of Leave voters (compared with 40% per cent of Remain voters) thought Brexit 
would reduce immigration, and that 55% of Leave voters were ‘intensely opposed’ to 
immigration (compared with 13% of Remain voters).  Third, the vote took place after 
many years of ‘austerity’, reflected in a fiscal squeeze which was quite considerable in 
some districts.  An analysis of district-level voting by Becker et al. (2017) found that 
a fairly modest reduction in the imposition of fiscal cuts might have been enough for 
Remain to have won (see Table 3).  Votes for UKIP picked up dramatically in areas 
with grievances against globalisation and weak socioeconomic fundamentals after 
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the austerity programme was initiated in 2010 (Becker and Fetzer 2018).  Individuals 
evaluating their financial situation as ‘quite difficult’ or ‘very difficult’ were more likely 
to favour leaving the EU (Liberini et al. 2017).
Table 3 Reversing the referendum result
Actual To reverse
Population share aged ≥ 60 (%) 24.0 12.3
Unemployment rate (%) 5.3 0.6
Fiscal cuts/ person (£) 448 407
Population share with no qualifications (%) 35.4 33.6
EU accession migrant growth rate, 2001-2011 (%) 1.7 -0.5
Note: ‘To Reverse’ is the value of the variable based on regression analysis that would give ‘Remain’ 50.01% of the vote 
(holding all other variables constant). 
Source: Becker et al. (2017).
Lessons from the UK’s Brexit vote can be understood in terms of the political 
trilemma.  Given that ‘global federalism’ (a ‘United States of Europe’) is infeasible, 
the deep integration of the EU co-exists with nation states on the basis of rules or, in 
Rodrik’s terminology, a ‘golden straitjacket’.  This tendency has been reinforced by 
the euro area crisis, notably by the Fiscal Compact of 2012 (Crum 2013), which is 
likely to require large primary budget surpluses if public debt-to-GDP ratios are to 
be reduced in the prescribed way.  But the vote for Brexit indicates that a strategy of 
maintaining European integration through strict rules that enforce austerity potentially 
at the expense of social transfers that cushion its adverse impacts and which preclude 
democratic control over sensitive issues like migration runs the risk of provoking a 
backlash that unleashes forces which threaten the viability of the EU.3  A new version of 
Rodrik’s ‘Bretton Woods Compromise’ which loosens some constraints on policy may 
be in order, since the economic costs of leaving the EU are not necessarily a sufficient 
deterrent to disintegration.
3 Although, according to Eurobarometer, opposition to free movement has been strongest in the UK in five other countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, and the Netherlands) more than 20% disapproved in 2016; an analysis of the responses 
suggests that there is ‘a ready reservoir of negative opinion’ to be exploited by Eurosceptic political movements when an 
opportunity arises (Vasilopoulou and Talving 2017).
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5 European Economic and 
Monetary	Union:	Past	
performance and future returns
Giuseppe Bertola
University of Turin and CEPR
Europe’s peaceful economic and monetary integration process is unprecedented in 
history, but its designers took into account historical lessons that currently appear 
forgotten. At the global level, supporters of the Trump administration’s tariffs and 
competitive devaluation threats disregard the unfortunate role played by such policies 
in the 1930s. In Europe, discussions of possible euro exit options seem somewhat 
oblivious to the similar and much more recent European experience of actual exchange 
rate instability in the 1970s and 1980s, and redenomination risk in the aftermath of the 
Great Recession.1 
History does not however offer easy solutions. The past is often burdensome, and 
memories can be manipulated to build myths in support of national interests. Only 
trust in future cooperation can support current cooperation, but opportunistic and 
shortsighted behaviour can easily disrupt peaceful international relations. Peace is in 
fact unusual in history. Broader economic integration underlies both material progress 
and socio-political conflicts, and has most often been forced by conquest (Findlay and 
O’Rourke 2009). 
Whether peaceful economic interactions can take place across political borders depends 
on whether those who would in autarky enjoy relative scarcity or monopoly power 
can be subdued or compensated. Social welfare schemes can help in this respect, and 
1 See https://www.welt.de/finanzen/article174560810/Euro-Nicht-nachhaltig-Notfallplaene-der-Oekonomen-Sinn-und-
Fuest.html.
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public budgets can buffer shocks that originate abroad, but these and other tools may 
or may not be effective, depending on politico-economic and geopolitical factors that 
underlie globalisation’s ebbs and flows in history. Rich countries did implement social 
and fiscal policy broadly as post-war trade grew strongly in Europe, across the Atlantic, 
and globally. 
Now, even as international economic interactions increasingly involve integrated 
production chains (Baldwin and Rodriguez 2015), the political appeal of international 
economic integration is weakened by systems competition (Sinn 2003), which makes 
it is difficult for national governments to enforce taxes and regulations that economic 
agents can easily escape across borders. In both respects, the efficient scale of production 
and policy has become larger than the nation states that proved capable of managing 
globalisation after the demise of empires, but cannot shelter from increasing inequality 
the lower-middle classes that are politically decisive in a democracy. 
The process that developed into the EU navigates the eternal yet ever-changing straits 
of national political tension and unavoidable international economic integration. It did 
so successfully for a remarkably long time, but is now finding it very difficult to deliver 
results in line with past performance. Some of the current European woes echo those of 
the 1920s. Then, problematic debt stocks originated in war victories and defeats (Tooze 
2014). Debt also looms large in times of great structural transformation. Adoption of a 
common currency and enlargement triggered financial flows that in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s were comparable to those seen during the Great War, and justified in the 
eyes of both lenders and borrowers by expectations of economic convergence (Bertola 
2017). Those expectations were falsified by the Great Recession, and the resulting euro 
crisis environment is unfortunately like that which Keynes (1922) characterised as an 
“atmosphere of distrust and hostility”. Much the same conflicts of interest as in the 
1920s are currently relevant to the conduct of the single monetary policy and in the 
implementation of fiscal policy constraints: creditors favour high interest rates and low 
inflation, even as this makes debt service more onerous for those who favour monetary 
and fiscal expansion. 
European Economic and Monetary Union: Past performance and future returns
Giuseppe Bertola
39
History often rhymes but does not repeat itself (not least because now Germany is cast as 
the creditor, not as the debtor it was in the 1920s). The next decades need not resemble 
the 1930s and 1940s, but to prevent open conflict it is key to recognise conflicting 
interests and find ways to reconcile them, in a climate of reciprocal trust, with suitable 
compromises across issues and over time. 
While the legal framework of the EU can play a role in fostering trust, sovereign nations 
need not respect rules. Threats of expulsion, and the availability of exit options, shorten 
the planning horizon, encourage opportunistic behaviour, and foster instability. To 
function properly, a club of nations has to rely on self-enforcing cooperative behaviour 
on the part of their members (EEAG 2018: Chapter 3). 
If it can be trusted to be long-lasting, then opportunities to reconcile conflicting 
interests over time can make it preferable to exit, hence indeed long-lasting. Achieving 
this cooperative equilibrium is in fact easier when members are heterogeneous across 
multiple dimensions and the club itself has multiple complementary purposes, making 
it possible to negotiate compromises across policy areas.
The original design of the European integration project does require member countries 
to satisfy conditions for take-it-or-leave-it accession to a comprehensive, evolving, 
single policy framework. Such a package deal may be disagreeable in some respects 
for some members at any point in time, but can be preferable to dissolution alternatives 
if it is trusted to last over a different future. Brexit and nationalistic political sentiment 
in many member countries currently challenge this mode of operation, which has in 
the past proved capable of discouraging opportunistic behaviour and preventing open 
conflict. If properly understood and implemented, it can continue in the future to foster 
trust, cooperation, and a constructive long-term perspective on problems and solutions.
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‘The future of Europe’ is not only an economic topic. It also has a political science, a 
legal, and a sociological dimension; and it has a foreign, security, and defence policy 
dimension, which is closely related to a geo-political dimension. Through which 
institutional setup can the EU best fulfil its self-assigned role along these dimensions?
This question clearly transcends the borders of the discipline of economics and can only 
be addressed by a (more than book-length) interdisciplinary treatment. This chapter has 
the more modest goal to share some observations and assessments from the author’s 
predominantly (but not solely) economic point of view. 
We can take a positive perspective: What will the EU look like in the future? Niels 
Bohr’s famous quote comes to mind: “Prediction is very difficult, especially if it’s about 
the future.” Hence, I will not make a prediction how the EU will look like in 2050 – 
such an attempt is bound to fail. Let us, for example, travel back in time to 1950s. Who 
at that time had envisaged the spectacular progress that European integration would be 
making over the next six decades: the expansion from originally six to 28 EU member 
states, the Single Market, the establishment of European institutions (the European 
Commission, Council, Parliament, Court of Justice, etc.), the introduction of a common 
European currency, and so on? On the other hand, let’s look back to 2005. Up to then, 
European integration was characterised by steady progress, the European Project in its 
substance undisputed, success taken for granted, and a failure and a break-up of the EU 
1 This chapter is an abridged version of presentation at the conference “From Bretton Woods to Berlaymont: Globalisation, 
Integration and the Future of Europe”, KOF/ETH Zurich, 22-23 March 2018. The full version is available at http://epub.
wu.ac.at/6249/1/wp264.pdf.
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not even conceivable. Who at that time had predicted that – over the next decade – the 
EU would be sliding into a severe economic and institutional crisis, that there would be 
a serious threat of a euro area breakup, and that these developments would culminate 
in the most severe backlash against European integration, namely, the British vote on 
leaving the EU?
Alternatively, we can take a normative perspective: What should the EU look like in 
the future? Which recommendations can we give to policymakers? There are many 
(economic) questions, where scientists can give precise, clear-cut recommendations 
that are shared by the vast majority of the scientific community. However, for the broad 
topic at hand – European integration and the future institutions of Europe – I am very 
reluctant to spell out clear-cut recommendations, since this topic not only transcends 
the borders of the discipline of economics, it also transcends the borders of scientific 
analysis. 
Accordingly, a clear line has to be drawn between what is desirable from a scientific 
perspective, which can be judged by objective standards, and what is desirable from a 
political perspective, which will vary with political preferences. It is a straightforward 
consequence of believing in democracy to admit that there are different, equally valid 
views on what the EU should look like in 2050. As a consequence, I am happy to see 
that even the European Commission – in its recent White Paper on the Future of Europe 
(European Commission 2017) – has spelled out this thought clearly by enumerating 
and describing five scenarios for the future of the EU. Fortunately, in Brussels the view 
has arrived that there are alternatives to “enlargement and deepening at any price”, 
that there is more than one way for the EU to survive, and that there is more than one 
attitude towards the future of the EU which is consistent with being a good European. 
Due to space constraints, I will focus on two perspectives enumerated by the 
Commission: i) doing less more efficiently, and ii) doing much more together. On 
second thought, these two options are inconsistent with each only other at a general, 
aggregate level of consideration. Different policy areas require different solutions. 
Economic theory, public choice theory, and the theory of fiscal federalism all lead to 
the conclusion that for different policy fields, there will be different optimal levels of 
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centralisation or integration. When judged on a case-by-case basis, there are likely to be 
policy fields where integration should be cut back and other policy fields where more 
supranationality is warranted.
Hence, a reasonable future scenario for the EU would be doing less in some areas, doing 
more in others. The obvious question then is: where to do what?  Or to put it differently: 
where do we need more supranationality, and where do we need more subsidiarity?
Economic theory spells out trade-offs revolving around economies of scale, 
heterogeneous local preferences, transaction and coordination costs, spillover effects, 
the provision of local public goods, and so on.2 Based on such an analysis, there are 
certainly policy areas where the benefits of centralisation outweigh its disadvantages – 
migration, security, defence, competition, and the environment are examples that come 
to mind immediately. “Doing much more together” would be the right approach in 
these fields. 
But for the vast majority of policy areas, (economic) theory gives us much less clear 
guidance about the optimal degree of centralisation. Yet, as Danthine (2017) points out, 
subsidiarity is still the key to Europe’s institutional problems; he even refers to it as a 
forgotten concept at the core of Europe’s existential crisis. 
I do not want to delve into an enumeration of the pros and cons of alternative governance 
models, this is well documented in the literature. If there is a general conclusion to be 
drawn, it is that in many (even narrowly defined) policy areas there is no governance 
model that is optimal under any internal and external circumstances and constraints. 
Since no one can reasonably predict how these internal and external circumstances and 
constraints will evolve over time, each choice within a certain range appears equally 
justified. 
2 There is one issue, however, that is hardly addressed in such comparisons, namely, the possibility that policy failures 
– such as the lack of ability to respond to shocks in a timely manner, the choice of solutions that are biased towards 
the interests of (a subset of) single member states, or the lack of coordination and absence of a coherent policy – may 
become more likely under more complex governance structures of large-scale institutions such as the EU. In my view, 
the handling of the financial and economic crisis as well as the refugee crisis are two cases in point.
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In the end, for many if not most policy areas, it boils down to one question: How much 
risk sharing is desired and how severe is the problem of moral hazard? Obviously, 
there are different (legitimate) assessments regarding the number of, and the weights 
assigned to, criteria of a social objective function, which includes more than purely 
economic variables.
If there is a range of possible, workable solutions, their ultimate choice should also be 
guided and influenced by political preferences, i.e. the democratic will of the European 
populations. This process of political clarification is of utmost importance and should 
be given the same priority and importance as the scientific, economic analysis.
Let me turn to my conclusions, which I will draw around two quotes. “Europe will 
not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete 
achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.” (Monnet 1950). Monnet’s vision 
has always been that economic integration comes first while political integration 
follows, and it follows in small steps and at a moderate pace. Over the last years, there 
may have been a disturbing mismatch in the speed of these two interrelated processes. 
“The Single Market and active competition policy remain the cornerstone of efforts at 
EU level to improve European growth performance. They represent a foundation without 
which other efforts would be wasted.” (Sapir et al. 2004: 158). Several shortcomings 
highlighted in the (15-year-old) Sapir report do still exist, and many recommendations 
are still valid. This is a serious problem, since no institutional setup can overcome 
shortcomings in the design of the European market (Alesina and Giavazzi 2007). 
Putting these arguments together, my recommendation is to focus on and speed up 
economic integration and carefully pursue political integration at a modest pace, but 
not without listening to the electorate. The alternative – forcing political integration 
first to be able to implement the required reforms, bypassing or evading the constituent 
– would be wrongheaded in my view. Further integrating economically first while 
pursuing a policy of small steps with respect to political integration is certainly the 
more cumbersome way; it will have to take some detours and it will be difficult to stay 
on track. But ultimately, this is the democratic way, the sustainable way, and the only 
way that is likely to be successful. 
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In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, one has observed in advanced democracies a 
recomposition of the political landscape suggesting that the main dimension of politics 
may be shifting to a new division, between anti-globalisation forces (mostly on the 
extreme right and extreme left) and pro-globalisation forces (Kriesi et al. 2012). Recent 
elections – the Brexit referendum in 2016, the election of Trump as president of the 
US in 2016, and the successes of Le Pen and Mélenchon in France’s 2017 presidential 
election, of AfD and die Linke in Germany’s 2017 election, and of Lega and M5S in 
Italy’s 2018 election – can be interpreted in this way. 
Guiso et al. (2017) have recently shown that economic insecurity following the 2008 
crisis has led to a loss of trust in traditional left-wing and right-wing parties. Populist 
parties have emerged to cater to this decline of trust and compete with mainstream 
parties, who have now started to also defend populist policies instead of vigorously 
opposing them. Dustmann et al. (2017) document a strong correlation between 
unemployment shocks at the regional level, trust deficit in political institutions, and 
votes for populist parties in the European Parliament elections. Similarly, Algan et al. 
(2017) found for EU countries a strong link between high increases in unemployment 
following the Great Recession and votes for populist parties and also a decline in trust 
in national and European political institutions.1 Anti-globalisation forces in Europe also 
generally campaign against the EU and the euro, following the Brexit model. 
1 Inglehart and Norris (2016) argue that cultural values, rather than economic factors, provide the most consistent 
explanation for voting support for populist parties.
Bretton Woods, Brussels and Beyond: Redesigning the Institutions of Europe
52
Does this all mean that the left-right cleavage that has been dominant in advanced 
democracies for decades is being replaced by a pro- versus anti-globalisation cleavage? 
Changing cleavages in the European Parliament
This is exactly what has been happening in the European Parliament, as we document 
in this chapter and in a longer new working paper (Hix et al. 2018). All our previous 
work (e.g. Hix et al. 2006, 2007), based on all collected roll call votes in the European 
Parliament, had shown that the left-right division was the main dimension of political 
conflict in the European Parliament, explaining the individual voting behaviour of the 
members of the European Parliament as well as the competition and coalitions between 
the European political groups. This has started to change substantially, especially 
since the election of the eighth European Parliament in 2014. In contrast to previous 
decades, the main dimension of politics in the European Parliament has shifted in a 
clear way, from left-right to pro/anti-EU, where the new pro/anti-EU conflict mirrors 
the pro/anti-globalisation conflict we increasingly see in national elections in Europe. 
This dimension had always been a second, less important dimension in the European 
Parliament, but the evidence we present suggests that it is now becoming the most 
important political dimension in the Parliament.
Table 1 shows the composition of the sixth, seventh and eighth directly elected European 
Parliaments.  The two main families in the European Parliament have been the Christian 
Democrats/Conservatives (EPP) and the Social Democrats (SOC), but their seat shares 
have gone down over time. The Liberals (ALDE) have a smaller seat share, but have 
often been pivotal and have split along left-right lines due to their centrist position. 
The Radical Left (GUE/NGL) regroups communist or former communist parties and 
extreme left parties. The Greens (G/EFA) are pro-environment parties allied with some 
left-wing regionalist parties. Outside these five groups, the other groups have been less 
stable. They regroup parties to the right of the EPP, anti-European parties and radical 
right parties. For example, in the seventh parliament, the British Conservatives broke 
away from the EPP to form a separate party group with more ‘nationalist’ conservative 
parties, mainly from central and eastern Europe.
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How do the European party groups vote and form coalitions on roll call votes in the 
European Parliament, and along what dimensions do they vote? In Hix et al. (2006, 
2007), using scaling programs developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1997) and 
Poole (2000) to identify dimensions of politics in the US Congress, we consistently 
found for the European Parliament that the first and main dimension, which accounts 
over 80% of individual voting decisions, could be explained by the standard left-right 
cleavage. There was also a second dimension, although substantively less significant 
(explaining an additional 2-5% of individual decisions), that could be explained by 
support for or opposition to the European integration process. We find the same when 
looking at the location of MEPs for the sixth Parliament (EP6, 2004-09) and the seventh 
Parliament (EP7, 2009-14). 
This can be seen in Figures 1a and b. The first dimension, along the horizontal line, in 
EP6 and EP7 is clearly related to the left-right dimension. On the left-hand side of the 
spatial map we have left-wing parties such as the radical left GUE-NGL (M in red in 
Figure 1), the Greens (V in green), and the Social Democratic parties (S in red in Figure 
1).  In the middle we have the centrist ALDE (L in yellow). On the right we have the 
EPP (P in blue) as well as other right-wing parties (G in blue and C in purple).  The 
second dimension, along the vertical axis, in EP6 and EP7 is related to attitudes towards 
European integration. Pro-EU parties are located on the top part of the map (essentially 
the Social Democrats, Liberals and Conservatives), while anti-EU parties are located on 
the bottom of the policy space (all the other parties). 
This two-dimensional spatial picture, with the left-right dimension as the main 
dimension and the EU dimension as a subsidiary second dimension, effectively 
explains European politics from most of the period since the first direction elections to 
the European Parliament in 1979. 
The eighth parliament (EP8, elected in 2014), however, shows a quite different 
configuration. Looking at Figure 1c, the two-dimensional space appears to be partially 
rotated clockwise. The first dimension cannot be clearly interpreted. It appears as if the 
new first, dominant dimension is a combination of the prior two dimensions, with the 
left/anti-EU forces on the left-hand side of the new main dimension and the right/pro-
EU forces on the right-hand side of the new main dimension. 
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Figure 1 Two-dimensional ideal points in the European Parliament 
a) The sixth European Parliament 
First Dimension
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































EP6 (2004-2009) All votes, N=6199
Left-RIght
b) The seventh European Parliament 
First Dimension
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































EP7 (2009-2014) All votes, N=6961
Left-Right
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c) The eighth European Parliament 
First Dimension



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































EP8 (2014-2019) All votes, N=6355
Left-Right
Figure 1 is based on all roll call votes in EP6, EP7 and EP8. We have also carried out a 
similar exercise to the one above but divided by policy area (Hix et al. 2018). For some 
policy issues the first dimension was left-right in EP6, and remained so in EP7 and 
EP8.  Those issues include employment, the environment, gender, the internal market 
and consumer protection, and industry, research and energy. For other policy issues, 
we observe some notable changes. For the budget, economic and monetary affairs, 
foreign affairs, and international trade, voting was traditionally always along the left-
right dimension, but in EP7 and especially in EP8, the dividing line has been pro/anti-
EU. Some of these changes started to happen in EP7, but they have been accelerating 
since EP8, clearly confirming that votes in the European Parliament are increasingly 
cast in terms of attitudes towards European integration, and increasingly less in terms 
of the traditional left-right dimension that had been dominant since 1978. 
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Policy conclusions  
The change that is taking place in the dominant political cleavage in the European 
Parliament has several implications. 
First of all, it is possible that national party groups will form new European party 
groups following the recomposition that we have been observing in France, where 
Emmanuel Macron’s centrist pro-globalisation party has become the first party in the 
French Parliament, overcoming the traditional left-right divide.  If this is the case, it 
could become a European-wide phenomenon. 
Second, this is not necessarily good news for the future of European integration. 
Debates in the European Parliament along the left-right dimension have created true 
democratic European politics, with shifting coalitions (for example, with a centre-
left coalition winning on some issues such as the environment and standards, and a 
centre-right coalition winning on other issues such as market deregulation). This well-
oiled, coalition-based structure of European politics could be pushed aside by more 
intractable conflicts over the nature of European integration, for example over whether 
there should be deeper integration in the euro area or whether there should be common 
EU refugee policies to resolve the migration crisis. Moreover, in this new structure of 
politics, if the democratic pendulum swings against the pro-EU/globalisation forces, 
as it is doing in many countries at the moment, we could see steps to undo parts of 
European integration. This does not necessarily mean the end of Europe, though, as 
other multi-level democratic polities have experienced phases of decentralisation or 
recentralisation over time. 
Third, it is not clear whether what seems to have become the new cleavage in advanced 
democracies will be a temporary or a lasting phenomenon. Judging from history, it 
will most likely be a temporary phenomenon. History has also shown that such large 
political disruptions can lead to widespread conflict. Anti-globalisation forces tend to 
breed nationalism and hatred for other nations and ethnicities, which can easily spill 
over into conflicts that more than 60 years of European integration have managed to 
eliminate. In any case, the European Parliament arising from the 2019 election is still 
likely to reinforce the increasingly dominant pro-/anti-globalisation cleavage.
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8  Institutions and convergence in 
Europe: The case of Structural 
Funds
Sascha O. Becker, Peter H. Egger, and Maximilian von Ehrlich
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Most federations – whether national or supra-national in scope – rely on a system 
of fiscal federalism with transfers across jurisdictions. The goal of such transfers is 
the equalisation, at least partially, of fiscal capacity and per capita income among 
participating jurisdictions. The EU’s structural operations are viewed as a fundamental 
pillar of cohesion through such redistribution from ‘richer’ to ‘poorer’ subnational 
regions in the EU. 
The lion’s share of the EU’s fiscal equalisation transfers is spent under the auspices 
of the Structural Funds programme (starting in 1989), and its most important funding 
schemes are the following: 
• The Convergence Objective (formerly Objective 1),
• The Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective (formerly Objective 2), 
• The European Territorial Cooperation Objective (formerly Objective 3).
Under a broader perspective, a main reason behind the support of cohesion and 
convergence through the structural operations is its support of the ‘poorest’ regions 
in order to provide for a better footing of the Economic and Monetary Union and the 
common currency, which all member countries and regions of the EU are envisaged to 
be part of sooner or later. Hence, the pursuit is one of establishing a more homogeneous 
macroeconomic environment that comes closer to what economists call an optimum 
currency area (Mundell 1961).
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There are other forces, foremost the European Single Market (since 1993) with its 
four freedoms of movement (of goods through the abolishment of tariff and non-
tariff barriers to trade, of capital, of services, and of workers), which should help in 
establishing such an area. However, it is held that the pro-common market environment 
will not be capable of establishing homogeneity at the national and subnational level as 
swiftly as desired. Accordingly, transfers as the ones defined in the structural operations 
are introduced to facilitate the the process.
Policy design
Structural operations are organised into programming periods: 1989-93, 1994-99, 2000-
06, 2007-13, 2014-20. The eligibility for transfers of different kinds is determined at 
two regional levels –NUTS2 (800,000 to 3,000,000 inhabitants) and NUTS3 (150,000 
to 800,000 inhabitants) – and the defining characteristics for transfer eligibility are 
specified in years immediately prior to the aforementioned programming periods. 
Overall, virtually all NUTS3 regions get some funding (which to some extent defies the 
idea of redistribution in its most stringent form), but eligibility for funding under the 
Convergence (Objective 1) line, which is the biggest budget subline and determined at 
the NUTS2 level, is more exclusive.
Clearly, as any redistribution scheme involves administrative slack, a minimum 
requirement for it to be justified is its effectiveness. However, evaluating the 
effectiveness of the structural operations is difficult because poorer regions tend to 
grow faster anyway and they are also more likely to receive funding, and more of it, 
than others. Hence, there is a mechanical positive correlation between receiving funding 
and growing faster, which should not be confused with causation – poorer EU regions 
would grow faster anyway in the absence of the structural operations.
However, the very design and some of the related arbitrary rule-making provide for the 
possibility of identification of the causal relationship between (at least some of) the 
funding and economic growth and other outcomes (Becker et al. 2010). For example, 
Convergence/Objective 1 treatment (the largest sub-programme) establishes eligibility 
for funding only if an NUTS2 region’s GDP per capita (corrected for purchasing power 
differences) falls short of 75% of the EU average (also corrected for purchasing power 
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differences). There are still some problems with this: time inconsistency and change of 
regional delineations of NUTS2 and NUTS3 regions in the national interest of getting 
better access to funding, but also Brexit; and the fuzzy implementation of the rules 
whereby not all eligible regions receive funds while some ineligible ones do. However, 
these concerns appear manageable towards an identification of the causal effect of 
structural operations programmes in view of available statistical methods. Moreover, 
fuzziness in the sense of treatment of ineligible regions and non-treatment of eligible 
regions declines when considering the Convergence/Objective 1 treatment: of the 187, 
209, 253, and 253 NUTS2 regions in the programming periods 1989-93, 1994-99, 
2000-06, 2007-13, about 7%, 8%, 7%, and 2%, respectively, had a treatment status 
different from their eligibility status (Becker et al. 2018).
Effectiveness of the structural operations
From a bird’s eye view, an evaluation of the structural operations’ convergence target 
can be summarised as follows:
• The scheme is effective for per-capita income growth on average in the sense 
that every euro spent generates somewhat more than a euro in per-capita income 
(i.e. the scheme appears to induce more than just a one-for-one consumption effect). 
However, the scheme does not trigger much of an employment effect in the short run 
(adjustment may be more sluggish there) and there is some evidence of a crowding-
out of private investment.
• The scheme is least effective where it is most needed, namely, in poor regions 
with low levels of absorptive capacity (little human capital and a lot of 
corruption). In such regions, funding is a wash (and macroeconomic conditions 
are not improved by the transfers received; Becker et al. 2013).
• The scheme ‘worked less well’, or at least differently, during the crisis: the 
effects on per-capita income growth were smaller, though those on employment 
were larger than before. However, regions which were more strongly hit in an 
adverse way by the crisis (as measured, for example, by a larger government bond 
yield spread of the country they are located in) were not shielded successfully by 
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the funds received (in part, perhaps, due to the lack of capacity to co-finance the 
received funds).
• The scheme triggers positive per-capita income growth effects relatively quick-
ly, but the effects are not very long-lived. Taking the funding away leads to a 
reversion to per-capita income levels (corrected for purchasing power differences) 
prior to when the funding had first been received – this may entail an un-cushioned 
loss for receiving regions in the UK after Brexit.
Outlook
The design and implementation of the EU’s structural operations are obviously in need 
of reform. In the past, the European Commission did not systematically and rigorously 
evaluate the effectiveness of its regional policy, as it has started to do in the more recent 
past. For a serious attempt at stimulating long-term growth, the programming periods 
appear short, and the associated relatively short planning horizon potentially reduces 
the longevity of the effects. 
Apart from targeting economic growth, the Commission might wish to tie transfer 
treatment to institutional change (such as quality of government, monitoring of 
expenses used, education, and so on). The amount of money spent could be reduced 
without lowering the effect if it is spent more wisely.
This does not call into question the institution of structural operations as such, but the 
design and ramifications of its implementation.
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The firewall and crisis resolution mechanisms established in the midst of the euro debt 
crisis demonstrated Europe’s commitment to multilateral cooperation. But there is 
general agreement that the Economic and Monetary Union needs further deepening 
and development. In December 2017, the heads of government agreed to concentrate on 
two issues for the June 2018 summit: completing Banking Union and transforming the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) into a European Monetary Fund.
The ESM and its predecessor, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), had 
to be put in place promptly to defend the euro area as markets derailed in response to 
a financial crisis unleashed in the US. G20-coordinated stimulus and liquidity support 
policies led to increasing public deficits, and debt in some countries. Then came a 
home-grown crisis, the European debt crisis, as markets refocused on negative debt 
dynamics, accelerating public deficits and debt, and a loss of competitiveness in some 
countries. Some countries in particular had been running ill-advised policies for an 
extended period and already suffered from heightened vulnerability (Jansen 2011, 
Regling 2018b, ESM 2017a).
The ESM was born as the lender of last resort for sovereigns in the euro area. When 
Greece was shut out of financial markets in early 2010, there was no institutional 
solution at hand despite general efforts to ensure stability. The Greek Loan Facility, 
created in 2010, drew on bilateral loans from the euro area members. But to ensure a 
1 The views expressed in this chapter are strictly those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the ESM 
or ESM policy. No responsibility or liability is accepted by the ESM in relation to the accuracy or completeness of the 
information presented.
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more timely mobilisation of sufficient volumes of financial assistance, the EFSF was 
created as a temporary and lean institution to finance stability support (Strauch 2018), 
one which signalled European commitment to the integrity of the euro area. The EFSF’s 
effectiveness as a lender was dependent on maintaining the highest possible credit rating 
– achieved through a lending capacity based on highly rated guarantors. As challenges 
emerged, the EFSF was adapted – its size was increased, funding strategy improved, 
and operational flexibility expanded. But political leaders decided it was necessary 
to build a permanent entity to reassure investors of the euro area’s commitment to 
resolving the sovereign debt crisis (Jansen 2011, Regling 2018a). The IMF’s lending 
policies and capacity would not have been enough on their own to cover the financing 
needs of some crisis-hit euro area countries (Kincaid 2016).
The euro area established this permanent institution as an international financial 
institution to “safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole” as part of 
a comprehensive policy response. Countries would also need to do their homework 
by reining in public deficits and modernising their economies, thereby regaining 
competitiveness. The ESM was not the only innovation, though. Unorthodox monetary 
policy also played a crucial role in calming markets. In addition, the European fiscal 
rules were tightened, and the European Commission received stronger powers to 
monitor and sanction budget offenders. Economic surveillance was also broadened 
(Regling 2018a). The crisis revealed more prevalent cross-border effects than had been 
expected, a result of the currency union’s level of integration and economic openness. 
The gains from policy coordination therefore outweighed the attendant costs.
The leaders endowed the crisis resolution mechanism with a capital structure to underpin 
its issuance capacity and high creditworthiness. This avoided a statistical rerouting of 
ESM liabilities to member states and therefore limited the burden on members’ public 
debt. With a lending capacity of €500 billion, the ESM is the largest of the regional 
financing arrangements (RFAs) that, together with the IMF, form the global financial 
safety net (see IMF 2017 or ESM 2014 for an overview of RFAs).
Euro area finance ministers form the ESM’s Board of Governors, and each nominates 
a member for a non-resident Board of Directors. These bodies take formal decisions 
on financial assistance and institutional issues. The size and political importance of 
the ESM’s financial assistance justifies a close relationship with its member states. 
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Members often discuss formal decisions in advance at the Eurogroup, a euro area 
formation of the Ecofin Council also comprised of the finance ministers. This overlap 
between the memberships of the ESM Board of Governors and the Eurogroup creates a 
close political link between the European institutions and the ESM.
While the EFSF’s tasks concentrated on raising and disbursing the financing needed, 
the ESM has gradually taken a more active and broader role in the provision of stability 
support. The ESM Treaty of 2012 assigned certain policy tasks to peer institutions 
to ensure early operational capacity, meaning programmes are therefore always joint 
operations with the European Commission and ECB. In addition, the IMF has been 
involved as a programme partner whenever possible. Having quickly gained credibility 
as a professional organisation, the ESM has now, for example, formalised its current 
more intensive working relationship with the European Commission. This agreement 
extends the working arrangement and information sharing to programme design, 
management, and ex post engagement (ESM 2018).
An independent evaluation of EFSF/ESM financial assistance (ESM 2017a) found that 
the institutional framework governing the cooperation between the EFSF/ESM and 
partner institutions worked during the crisis. This is important as assistance is subject to 
strict economic reform programmes, similar to the cash-for-reform approach applied by 
the IMF. The joint nature of the programmes required a strong alignment of objectives 
among the partner institutions. Less formal working relationships complemented the 
institutional framework. The alignment of objectives turned out to be challenging at 
times, as programme governance faced multiple stakeholder interests (ESM 2017a). 
The problem of numerous principals can be found more generally in international 
organisations, with repercussions for the consistency of their strategy (Lamdany and 
Martinez-Diaz 2009).
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The euro area’s strategy has worked. Having approved €383 billion in total assistance, 
the EFSF and ESM have disbursed €279 billion (Table 1), largely in front-loaded loan 
programmes and at perceptibly lower rates than the IMF loans, generating substantial 
budgetary savings for the beneficiaries. Simultaneously, the EFSF and ESM provided 
financial assistance at longer maturities than IMF loans, and these maturities were 
subsequently extended further for some countries (in the case of Greece, up to 
32.5 years), thus substantially smoothing their repayment profiles. At end-March 2018, 
€254.5 billion of loans was outstanding. As a creditor, the members granted the ESM 
seniority immediately after the IMF.
To conduct this business, the ESM raises funds from investors by issuing securities, 
unlike the IMF and the other RFAs whose members fund them from their foreign 
reserves. The ESM can do so at favourable rates because of a high credit rating based 
on its €80.5 billion paid-in capital. As key issuers, the EFSF and ESM are recognised by 
their inclusion in major government bond indices. But market financing, often at fixed 
rates, generates a limitation – for example in comparison to the IMF. When members 
benefit from a strong recovery, as Spain and Ireland did, they would often like to 
proceed with early reimbursements and the EFSF/ESM could face a replacement cost 
that would normally be recovered from the member.
Lessons for institutional development
The ESM has responded effectively to member states’ crisis needs as part of the broader 
European framework. The Five Presidents’ Report of 2015 (Juncker et al. 2015) and 
the subsequent reflection paper (European Commission 2017) structured the debate on 
future euro area reform needs, including thoughts on developing a European Monetary 
Fund (EMF). The general objective is an institution with a greater responsibility as 
a crisis resolution mechanism, while interested parties are debating other potentially 
attached mandates and governance features. Emphasis on the Banking Union in the 
short-term agenda is in line with a broader G20 tendency to concentrate on financial 
sector risks (Cheng 2016), given financial rescue operations can increase feedback 
effects from bank risk into sovereign risk (Erce 2015). Most likely to emerge from this 
debate is a fiscal backstop to the bank resolution fund.
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The other building blocks of the euro area debate are risk-sharing through capital 
markets or fiscal arrangements, such as rainy day funds (Lenarcic and Korhonen 2018), 
and a sovereign debt restructuring framework to be operated in connection with future 
EMF lending. These can take various forms, and the ESM could play some role in their 
operation if member states so decide (Regling 2018c).
More specifically, according to the recommendations of the high-level evaluator’s 
report, the ESM could strengthen its operation as a firewall by taking the following 
steps:
1. The independent evaluator recommended that ESM members discuss a broader 
preventive capacity for the financial stability of the euro area. The ESM’s early 
warning mandate is limited in purpose to the monitoring of countries after a 
programme; a future EMF could have a peace-time monitoring function. Review of 
access criteria to some instruments could also support readiness to request assistance 
when problems cannot be solved at the national level. The issue of late request for 
assistance is well-known at the IMF, but has been difficult to tackle, despite the 
Fund’s long experience and regular country surveillance.
2. More narrowly within its current mandate, the ESM should focus on programme 
credibility and seek ways to support programme ownership. The programme 
governance framework should therefore evolve to align stakeholder objectives 
early on in the process. This entails a programme design with clear objectives and 
priorities that constitute measures capable of delivering significant macroeconomic 
effects. Countries also need to address financial sector issues upfront, and associated 
disbursements can be more directly linked to progress in a financial-sector specific 
strategy.
3. More intense cooperation between the European institutions can also achieve 
benefits. Formal cooperation agreements such as the one agreed with the Commission 
in April 2018 clarify roles and ensure that the ESM has the necessary information 
available. Similar action with supervisory authorities and the IMF would strengthen 
the capacity to deal with often rapidly evolving circumstances.
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4. The evaluation also recommended various steps to enhance programme transparency 
and evaluability, including through more consistent public reporting.
Looking ahead, a strengthened firewall could help to make the monetary union more 
robust and support the effective functioning of banking union. The ESM is more 
actively engaged than its predecessor, and many members want the ESM to play an even 
greater role. It is the euro area leaders’ prerogative to consider how to best implement a 
preventive capacity that can help the area tackle the next crisis, and how to further focus 
assistance to deliver the most significant effects.
References
Cheng, G (2016), “The Global Financial Safety Net through the Prism of G20 Summits”, 
ESM working paper 13/2016.
Erce, A (2015), “Bank and sovereign risk feedback loops”, ESM working paper 1/2015
ESM (2014), “Regional Financial Institutions – ESM is the biggest by far”, in ESM 
Annual Report 2014.
ESM (2017a), “EFSF/ESM Financial assistance”, Evaluation Report, 15 June.
ESM (2017b), “Evaluation of EFSF and ESM financial assistance: Technical 
Appendices”, 15 June . 
ESM (2018), “Memorandum of Understanding on the working relations between the 
European Commission and the European Stability Mechanism”, 27 April.
Juncker, J-C in close cooperation with D Tusk, J Dijsselbloem, M Draghi and M Schulz 
(2015), The Five Presidents’ report: Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary 
Union, European Commission.
European Commission (2017), “Reflection paper on Deepening of the Economic and 
Monetary Union”, 31 May . 
IMF (2017), “Collaboration Between Regional Financing Arrangements and the IMF—
Background Paper”, IMF Policy Paper, July .
Bretton Woods, Brussels and Beyond: Redesigning the Institutions of Europe
74
Jansen, R (2011), “What is what in Europe. The EFSF and the ESM – a legal overview”, 
European Banking & Financial Law Journal 2011(4). 
Kincaid, G R (2016), “The IMF’s Role in the Euro Area Crisis: What are the Lessons 
from the IMF’s Participation in the Troika?”, IMF Independent Evaluation Office 
background paper BP/16-02/06.
Lamdany, R and L Martinez-Diaz (2009), “Evaluating the governance of the IMF”, in 
R Lamdany and L Martinez-Diaz (eds), Studies of IMF Governance: A Compendium, 
Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF.
Lenarcic, A and K Korhonen (2018), “The case for a European rainy-day fund”, ESM 
discussion paper (forthcoming).
Regling, K (2018a), “The ESM and euro area financial stability”, speech at the 
Institutional Money Congress, Frankfurt, 28 February.
Regling, K (2018b), “The future of the ESM”, speech at the Financial Market Meeting 
of the CDU Economic Council, Brussels, 14 March.
Regling, K (2018c), “The ESM’s role in deepening monetary union”, speech at the 
German Economic Institute and Association of German Banks, 21 March .
Strauch, R (2018), “Completing the Monetary Union: The role of the ESM”, speech 
at the RBWC conference on “The global economic expansion – synchronised or 
coincidence?”, Washington, DC, 20 April.
About the author
Kari Korhonen works as Senior Advisor at the European Stability Mechanism, focusing 
on strategic work streams related to the ESM’s mandate and deepening of the EMU. He 
joined the ESM in the autumn of 2013. Recently, he led a dedicated evaluation team to 
support Ms. Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell as the Independent Evaluator appointed by the 
Finance Ministers. The first evaluation report on ESM activities was presented to the 
ESM Board of Governors in June 2017. Currently, Kari leads the follow-up action plan.
An institutional innovation in the euro debt crisis: The ESM
Kari Korhonen
75
Mr. Korhonen served as Senior Adviser to the Executive Director at the Nordic-Baltic 
constituency in the International Monetary Fund during 2010-2013, the height of the 
recent crisis. He has experience on policy analysis and policy making, including in the 
area of crisis preparation and financial stability. Previously, he acted for several years as 
head of division at the Bank of Finland and head of unit in UNESCO.

Part III






Isabel Schnabel and Christian Seckinger
University of Bonn and CEPR; Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg
After a substantial deepening of banking sector integration in Europe before the global 
financial crisis, the process saw a sharp reversal with the onset of the crisis. Banks 
reduced their lending in foreign countries and closed branches and subsidiaries. Such 
disintegration is common in times of financial crises, as has been documented by 
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011), Giannetti and Laeven (2012), as well as De Haas and 
van Horen (2013).
Particularly in Europe, regulatory and political pressure appears to have reinforced the 
process of fragmentation. Motivated by the fact that internationally active banks had to 
be rescued by national governments, regulators and national authorities started to act 
in a protectionist manner. Politicians conditioned the rescue packages in many cases 
on measures that reinforced fragmentation. For example, Commerzbank was rescued 
under the condition of shifting their focus on lending towards German small and 
medium-sized firms. In the UK, banks could obtain cheap central bank funding under 
the condition of supporting local corporations. On a supra-national level, the European 
Commission investigated the rescue of European banks with respect to their compliance 
with European state aid regulations. As in the case of German Landesbanken, they 
often asked for restructuring measures that implied a substantial reduction of foreign 
business.
In spite of subsequent attempts to foster financial reintegration, for example through 
the establishment of the Banking Union, the European banking sector remains 
more fragmented today than it had been before the crisis. European policymakers 
are concerned about this development because banking sector integration may 
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affect European growth prospects, the transmission of the ECB’s monetary policy, 
and financial stability. Especially in a currency union, financial integration is a key 
mechanism for risk sharing.
Real growth effects of banking sector integration in crisis 
and non-crisis times
In a recent paper (Schnabel and Seckinger 2015), we analyse the real growth effects 
of the fragmentation process in European banking markets after the financial crisis. 
Using data from 2000 to 2012, our dataset covers the period of integration before 
the global financial crisis and the following period of fragmentation. We specifically 
analyse whether the effects of banking sector integration differ between crisis and non-
crisis times, phases of domestic bank deleveraging and other times, as well as times of 
disintegration and integration.
Using industry-level data from Eurostat, we apply the methodology of Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) and investigate production growth differentials on industry level. We 
assume that industries with a high dependence on external finance are more constrained 
in their growth potential by financial frictions than industries with an inherently 
lower need for external capital. Deeper banking sector integration may reduce these 
frictions and increase the differential of industry production growth between financially 
dependent and non-dependent industries. The main advantage over country-level 
approaches is a more credible identification. Since industry-specific growth is unlikely 
to affect the development of banking sector integration, reverse causality is less of a 
concern than in country-level studies. Moreover, given the three-dimensional feature 
of the data set (country, industry, and time), the approach allows us to control broadly 
for unobserved heterogeneity by including the full set of two-dimensional fixed effects. 
Thereby, one can control for national business cycles, industry-specific trends, as well 
as time-invariant country-specific industry characteristics.
The real costs of financial disintegration
Isabel Schnabel and Christian Seckinger
81
Our study intends to identify short-run growth effects of integration. Therefore, the 
analysis relies on annual data rather than long-run averages as in the original Rajan-
Zingales analysis. Banking sector integration is measured by total assets of foreign 
banks over GDP. Hence, we focus on the overall amount of foreign bank assets rather 
than the composition of bank assets.
Our analysis suggests that the financial fragmentation process generated significant 
growth losses, which emphasises the need for financial reintegration in Europe. In 
particular, we find substantial positive growth effects of banking sector integration 
in EU member countries over the entire sample period. Interestingly, growth effects 
are more than four times bigger during times of crisis than in normal times. Similarly 
striking differences are found in phases of strong domestic bank deleveraging compared 
to other times, but less so in periods of financial disintegration. This seems to reflect 
the importance of foreign capital as an insurance mechanism against negative shocks to 
domestic bank lending in times of crisis and deleveraging. We further analyse the impact 
of cross-border lending on industry growth differentials. For cross-border lending we 
find mixed results, whereas our main results on foreign bank assets prove to be robust 
to this modification. This suggests that in particular the presence of foreign banks via 
branches and subsidiaries is important to buffer the adverse effects of domestic financial 
constraints. Results are also robust to measuring banking sector integration by foreign 
loans to non-financial corporations instead of foreign bank assets.
The importance of fostering financial reintegration in 
Europe
Based on our results, we conclude that banking sector integration plays an important 
role for economic growth in the EU. Especially in times of domestic crises and 
deleveraging, financial disintegration can have large negative real effects. Therefore, 
concerns of European policymakers about the adverse growth effects of financial 
disintegration in the European banking sector seem to be justified. Especially when 
domestic banks shrink their balance sheets, financial fragmentation has exceptionally 
strong negative growth effects. The robust finding of strong negative growth effects 
of financial fragmentation calls for additional international efforts to overcome 
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protectionist tendencies on a national level. They also cast doubts on measures by the 
European Commission fostering financial disintegration. Finally, they emphasise the 
importance of projects promoting financial integration at the European level.
This includes completing the Banking Union by establishing a well-designed European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) (see Schnabel and Véron 2018 for a recent proposal), 
a phasing out of geographical ring-fencing with respect to capital and liquidity, the 
strengthening of the Single Rulebook, a reduction of regulatory options and national 
discretion, as well as a further harmonisation of insolvency laws and rules for 
consumer protection. These would also set incentives for pan-European bank mergers. 
Furthermore, it speaks in favour for the acceleration of the development of a Capital 
Markets Union as a complement to Banking Union. A special focus should be put 
on promoting resilient capital flows, which implies favouring equity over debt, long-
term over short-term debt, and retail over wholesale funds. This suggests removing 
the existing debt bias by further strengthening the Single Resolution Mechanism and 
by conducting tax reforms that remove the debt bias in taxation. Capital Markets 
Union would also benefit from strengthening ESMA, which may serve as a catalyst 
for a further legal harmonisation in rules and implementation, and a standardisation 
of financial products. The Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union may set the 
stage for a new era of European financial integration, which we believe is an important 
building block of future growth perspectives in the EU.
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The divergent fates of the euro area economies highlight the need for institutions that 
can help insure country-specific risk and that, at the same time, are robust to systemic 
shocks. Capital (i.e. equity and bond) market integration in the euro area has remained 
relatively limited since the inception of the common currency, and European firms 
tend to more dependent on bank finance than their US counterparts. Therefore, recent 
policy discussion about risk sharing mechanisms for the EMU (Buti 2018) has focused 
on Banking Union and fiscal insurance mechanisms. However, fiscal transfers absorb 
only about 10-15% of shocks among the regions of established monetary unions, 
whereas private capital markets absorb about 50% of shocks on average (the US has 
been extensively studied but similar results hold in other federations – e.g.  Feld et 
al. 2018 for Switzerland). Given these magnitudes, and considering the political 
barriers to anything resembling US-style federalism in the euro area, Hoffmann and 
Sørensen (2012) argue that better integration of capital and banking markets is of first 
order magnitude in the euro area. In recent work, we further study the role of banking 
integration and its relation to capital market integration. Based on this research, this 
chapter argues that a deepening Banking Union is going to accentuate the need for 
deeper capital market integration – Banking Union and Capital Market Union are 
complements, not substitutes. 
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Using the accounting framework of Asdrubali et al. (1996), the main components of risk 
sharing are private income smoothing, countercyclical net transfers from the federal 
government, and procyclical savings behaviour. Briefly, the mechanisms are as follows: 
output of a given country will generate income in other countries if ownership of firms 
is diversified across countries. As dividends and capital gains accrue to owners across 
countries, this helps diversify income, making it less volatile – this type of risk sharing 
is therefore often labelled income smoothing or ‘capital market’ risk sharing. Further, 
for given income, countries can isolate consumption from fluctuations by selling or 
purchasing assets; that is, from countercyclical savings behaviour. This helps making 
consumption less volatile, and is therefore often labelled consumption smoothing.1 In 
several recent papers, we address the role of banking integration using this framework 
and draw three main insights. 
1.’Deep’, not just ‘interbank’, banking integration is needed 
for better risk sharing and resilience to systemic shocks. 
The inception of the euro was a catalyst for banking integration, but the nature of this 
integration was uneven. Hoffmann et al. (2017) argue that the euro created an integrated 
interbank market, but it did not achieve what we call deep cross-border integration in 
the banking sector – i.e. through direct cross-border lending of banks to the real sector 
or through cross-border consolidation of banks. Even though there were no formal 
restrictions for individual banks to move into other markets in the euro area, in the years 
prior to the crisis few banks entered retail markets in other member countries and the 
extent of cross-border lending to the non-bank sector remained very limited. Hoffmann 
et al. (2017) show empirically that this focus on interbank banking integration meant 
that banking integration was quickly reversed during the crisis and that it exacerbated, 
rather than smoothed, macroeconomic asymmetries among EMU countries after 2008. 
Countries with high levels of dependence on domestic banks and sectors with many 
1 The literature also sometimes refers to this channel as ‘credit market smoothing’, even though the sale and purchase of 
assets for consumption smoothing happens in other markets as well.
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bank-dependent small firms suffered the most. Hoffmann et al. (2018) extend this 
analysis to look at the channels of risk sharing in the EMU before and after 2008 using 
a quantitative model that explicitly separates deep and interbank banking integration.

























































Notes: The figure plots the degree of income smoothing (green line) and consumption smoothing (red line) for the Eurozone 
economies from the first quarter of 1996 to the fourth quarter of 2013. 
Source: Hoffmann et al. (2018). 
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Our results, summarised in Figure 1, show that risk sharing was weak during the years 
after 2008, exactly when it was most urgently needed. We show that consumption 
smoothing accounts for most of this decline in risk sharing. By contrast, income 
smoothing remained relatively stable (though at a low level). This drying-up of 
consumption smoothing is strongly associated with a decline in cross-border interbank 
flows. Direct cross-border banking integration, by contrast, is strongly associated with 
better income smoothing and held up well during the crisis. These results suggest that 
only deep banking integration makes risk sharing resilient against systemic shocks.
2. The situation in the euro area today is reminiscent of that 
of the US prior to state-level banking deregulation in the 
1980s
As in the euro area today, the pre-1980 US had a common interbank market, but little 
deep interstate banking integration (Hoffmann et al. 2017). Interestingly, the risk-
sharing channels and their (lack of) resilience to aggregate shocks resembled what 
we observe in the euro area today. Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-Stewen (2011) show 
that prior to state-level banking deregulation, interstate risk sharing increased in US-
wide booms, but dried up in aggregate recessions – this was due in particular to the 
procyclical nature of consumption smoothing. This is exactly the pattern that Hoffmann 
et al. (2018) document for the EMU during the crisis. 
Banking deregulation in the US changed this pattern in two important ways. As shown 
by Demyanyk et al. (2007), deregulation of state-level banking markets led to more 
income smoothing among US states, consistent with Hoffmann et al. (2018) finding 
direct banking integration to be associated with better income risk sharing in Europe. 
The increased level of income smoothing in the US also made risk sharing more resilient 
to aggregate downturns. Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-Stewen (2011) show that the 
procyclicality of interstate risk sharing vanished after state-level deregulation. Banking 
deregulation in the US is therefore akin to the step towards deep banking integration 
that is still largely missing in Europe. The euro area needs a genuine banking union 
that will encourage cross-border consolidation of banks and lead to more direct cross-
border lending to firms and households. 
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3. Deep banking integration increases the need for 
increased capital market integration
Our empirical results for the US and the EMU suggest that direct cross-border banking 
integration has risk-sharing benefits similar to those of increased cross-border ownership 
of equity: it leads to more income smoothing and is resilient to persistent asymmetric, 
as well as common, shocks. This suggests that deep banking integration could substitute 
for equity market integration; however, Hoffmann et al. (2018) demonstrate that deep 
banking integration and equity market integration are complements, not substitutes. 
The reason for this is that, as shown by Demyanyk et al. (2007) and Hoffmann and 
Shcherbakova-Stewen (2011), banking integration improves the access of bank-
dependent firms to credit, making it easier for firms to finance investment and wage 
payments, and thus making labour income and investment less sensitive to asymmetric 
productivity shocks. However, firm profits become more volatile, which increases the 
importance of cross-border dividend income flows – i.e. capital market integration.
Our research suggests that Capital Market Union and Banking Union are complements. 
If further integration of the euro area is to be successful, both unions need to be 
completed. At the same time, the results surveyed here suggest that the risk-sharing 
benefits from banking integration are only robust to large global financial shocks if 
banking integration is sufficiently deep – i.e. it is focused on cross-border lending 
between banks and the real sector (or on cross-border bank consolidation) and not 
predominantly on cross-border interbank lending. One key precondition for such deep 
banking integration to be achieved is to decouple banks’ fate from the solvency of 
their regulating sovereign (i.e. to break the ‘doom loop’) through the creation of a 
common deposit insurance system for the euro area and the implementation of the 
Single Resolution Mechanism with a meaningful fiscal backstop, as suggested, for 
example, by the group of 14 French and German economists recently (Bénassy-Quéré 
et al. 2018). The creation of Europe-wide credit registries, as well as the removal of 
special national laws favouring public and regional banks in the member states that de 
facto block entry and cross-border consolidation in many local banking markets, are 
additional measures to be considered. 
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Did austerity in Europe save the region from an unsustainable escalation in public debt, 
or were austerity policies to blame for the prolonged period of economic stagnation 
in the wake of the Great Recession? Would greater labour mobility between countries 
in Europe have helped or hurt the recovery? By now there is a sizeable literature 
documenting the extent of austerity policies and (the lack of) labour mobility in Europe, 
though there is little consensus about their ultimate effects. 
There are many ways economists attempt to answer questions like these. Our approach 
is to use model-based simulations combining insights from economic theory with 
empirical observations to analyse alternative scenarios called ‘counterfactuals’. 
Specifically, we have developed a quantitative model that includes 29 European 
countries and reflects bilateral trade shares, country sizes, and the monetary policy 
regimes for each country (i.e. whether or not the country is part of the euro area). Key 
features that allow this model to generate patterns observed in the data are trade in 
intermediate goods, sticky prices, hand-to-mouth consumers, and financial frictions. 
In a recent paper (House et al. 2017), we use this tool to document the extent of austerity 
policies during the 2010-2014 period. Differences in austerity across countries – defined 
as government purchases below forecast – account for roughly two-thirds of the cross-
sectional variation in GDP during this post-recession period. At a time when faltering 
economies required stimulus, most countries in Europe cut government spending 
and those that cut spending most experienced the sharpest declines in output. In our 
sample, the cross-sectional multiplier is approximately two. Other austerity policies, 
such as cutting transfer payments or increasing taxes, do not explain the cross-sectional 
variation in output. We find little evidence that austerity in government purchases is a 
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consequence of the run up of government debt during the Great Recession. Austerity 
policies were pursued by virtually all European countries regardless of their debt-to-
GDP ratios in 2009. 
The model allows us to consider the dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio under different 
conditions. The main rationale for austerity was to reduce debt and bring debt-to-
GDP ratios back to historical norms. However, our model suggests that reductions in 
government spending had such a severe contractionary effect on economic activity and 
tax revenues that debt-to-GDP ratios in many countries actually increased as a result. 
Figures 1a and 1b show the increase in debt-to-GDP in Portugal and Spain relative 
to 2009Q4. The grey line in each figure is the actual increase in government debt to 
GDP, excluding interest payments. The dotted line shows the trajectory for debt to GDP 
generated by our model, under the assumption that the economy is at the zero lower 
bound (ZLB). The black line shows a counterfactual generated by the model when the 
country does not pursue austerity but still experiences the effects of the shared euro 
area monetary policy. In both countries, the model with austerity and the ZLB tracks 
the actual path of debt to GDP quite closely. The model overshoots the data by roughly 
5 to 10 percentage points. This could be because our model does not include some of 
the tax changes that were imposed during this period.  
Figure 1 Increases in debt to GDP 
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In more recent work (House et al. 2018), we extend our analysis to allow for labour 
mobility. Statistically, migration rates are substantially higher in the US than in the 
euro area. In the data, net migration flows at the business cycle frequency are strongly 
associated with unemployment rate differentials; that is, there is a net inflow of workers 
when unemployment is relatively low. This is true across states in the US and across 
countries in Europe, though the strength of this effect is roughly three times greater in 
the US. 
When we add job search and unemployment to the multi-country model, these frictions 
give rise to realistic unemployment differentials across regions and provide a motivation 
for cross-border labour mobility. To simulate labour migration in Europe, we calibrate 
the model to match the observed response of net migration to unemployment rates in 
the European data. Similarly, we can simulate inter-state labour migration in the US 
by setting the model’s parameters to match observed responses of net migration to 
unemployment differentials in the US data. 
In a classic paper in 1961, Robert Mundell argued that labour mobility was a necessary 
precondition for an optimal currency area. We use the model to evaluate Mundell’s 
conjecture. More specifically, we use the model to consider two counterfactual 
scenarios: first, we ask what the European experience would have been had migration 
been as strong in Europe as it is in the US; second, we ask what would have happened 
if all of the countries in Europe had flexible currencies and could conduct independent 
monetary policies. 
The model reveals that Mundell’s conjecture was surprisingly accurate. The outcome 
in Europe under flexible exchange rates but low labour mobility would be very similar 
to the outcome with fixed exchange rates but labour mobility at US levels. To illustrate 
this point, Figures 2a and 2b display simulated paths of unemployment rates for the 
GIIPS economies (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) and for the EU10 (Austria, 
Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Slovenia, 
and Slovakia). Because we are interested in cyclical movements in labour driven by 
unemployment differentials, we adjust unemployment in each country by subtracting 
out its long run average rate and by subtracting the average unemployment rate in 
Europe each year. This residual then tells us if unemployment in a given country is 
high relative to its historical rate and high relative to other countries in Europe. The 
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heavy dotted line shows unemployment rates for the baseline case – not surprisingly, 
given the way we choose the demand shocks, it lines up perfectly with the data. The 
line with short dashes shows the path for unemployment if exchange rates are flexible 
but labour is immobile. Such a policy would have reduced cross-sectional variation in 
unemployment rates across countries by about 40% in the euro area. The line with long 
dashes shows the alternative where the currency union remains in place but Europeans 
are as mobile as Americans. The implied path of unemployment rates would have 
almost been as smooth as in the previous experiment. The cross-sectional standard 
deviation in the euro area would have declined by 36% (versus 40% in the experiment 
with floating exchange rates).
Figure 2  Unemployment rates: Migration versus floating exchange rates 
We interpret these results as confirming Mundell’s conjecture that labour mobility can 
operate as a substitute for floating exchange rates. The required population changes 
associated with labour mobility in the absence of exchange rate adjustment, however, 
are quite big. The GIIPS countries would have lost almost 8% of their population 
between 2009 and 2014, whereas the EU10 would have gained about 2.4%. Whether 
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such large population movements are politically acceptable is an open question. The 
alternative may be large unemployment differentials across countries that cannot be 
offset by a one-size-fits-all monetary policy. 
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At the launch of the euro, there were fears that a lack of labour mobility would doom 
the viability of a single currency. On 21 September 1992, four famous professors – 
Olivier Blanchard, Rudi Dornbusch, Stan Fischer, and Paul Krugman – took part in a 
panel discussion at MIT on the merits of the proposed unification of European currency. 
Echoing a view common among US-based academics at the time, all four agreed that 
“a common European currency would have unfavourable economic repercussions”. 
Blanchard noted that “currency unification works in the United States because labour 
can move between states. The labour mobility in Europe is negligible.”
How has labour mobility evolved over the subsequent 25 years? Recent research 
suggests mobility within Europe has been picking up while intra-US mobility has been 
slowing down, bringing the two currency unions closer in this respect.
Measuring mobility: The canonical model
The canonical way of describing regional evolutions is due to Blanchard and Katz 
(1992). Their results suggested a very rapid and robust response of inter-state mobility 
in the US in response to regional shocks. Early extensions of the Blanchard-Katz 
methodology to Europe (Decressin and Fatas 1995) suggested a much weaker response 
of mobility, establishing the conventional wisdom that Europe lacked one of the 
necessary mechanisms for a successful currency union. 
Figure 1 updates the Blanchard-Katz empirical exercise with 20 additional years of US 
data. A 1% shock to state employment raises state unemployment that year by about 0.2 
percentage points and lowers state participation rates by about 0.25 percentage points. 
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The implied labour mobility is the difference between the size of the employment shock 
and the sum of changes in unemployment and participation. In terms of number of 
people, the Blanchard-Katz exercise suggests that out of every ten workers who lose 
their job in a US state due to an adverse shock, two workers become unemployed, two 
workers drop out of the labour force, and six workers move out of the state. 
Declining US mobility
While the update shows broad support for the overall thrust of the Blanchard-Katz 
findings, a closer look suggests the response of mobility may be declining over time 
(Dao et al. 2017). The longer time series permits two important tests of the original 
findings. First, it permits tests of sub-sample stability to see if the implied response of 
migration has changed over time. Second, there are now better data on migration flows, 
which allows a direct cross-check on the estimates of implied migration. 













Note: the horizontal axis measures years
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Both implied mobility (using the Blanchard-Katz methodology) and direct estimates of 
mobility using migration data point to declining mobility over time in the US.  While 
inter-state migration still spikes up during recessions, during normal times there has 
been a trend decline in the adjustment through migration. Between 1985 and just prior 
to the Great Recession, the propensity to migrate within the first year in response to a 
state labour demand shock decreased by more than half. Instead, workers were much 
more likely to drop out of the state labour force. The finding of declining US migration 
has been corroborated in many other papers using different data sets and methodologies 
(see Austin et al. 2018 for a survey and additional evidence).
Increasing European mobility
In Europe, the trend appears to have been in the opposite direction. Dao et al. (2014) 
replicated the Blanchard-Katz analysis using data for 173 regions for 21 European 
countries over the period 1998-2009.  On average over the whole sample, a 1% adverse 
shock to regional labour demand raises the unemployment rate in the first year by about 
0.15 percentage points and lowers the participation rate by 0.6 percentage points. That 
is, out of every ten workers that lose employment, one worker becomes unemployed, 
six drop out of the labour force, and three workers migrate out of the region within the 
first year following the shock. 
In contrast to the case of the US, there is evidence of increasing mobility over time in 
Europe. The medium-run response of migration over the 2004 to 2009 sub-sample has 
increased when compared with the full sample results, while the role of participation 
rate has decreased (Figure 2 left panel). The response of migration is also stronger 
outside the EU15 countries.1 As shown in the right panel of Figure 2, the role of 
migration as a shock absorber is considerably larger in the case of the EU21 than for 
the EU15 countries.  Hence the response of migration to regional labour demand shocks 
in Central and Eastern European countries has been on average larger than in Western 
European countries.
1 The EU15 consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.
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Many other studies report similar findings, notably Beyer and Smets (2015), who 
conclude that “we detect a convergence of the adjustment processes in Europe and the 
United States, reflecting both a fall in interstate migration in the United States and a rise 
in the role of migration in Europe”.
Mobility since the Great Recession
During the Great Recession, inter-state migration again picked up in the US; hence, 
while mobility was becoming somewhat more dormant as an adjustment mechanism, it 
is certainly not dead and does respond in the face of severe regional shocks. Migration 
also remained high among European regions: a comprehensive study by Arpaia et 
al. (2016) finds that “since the start of the 2008 crisis, mobility has played a more 
important role in the adjustment of labour markets than in the past”. Overall, the results 
suggest that Europe has been moving to strengthen one of the adjustment mechanisms 
needed for a successful currency union. 
Of course, migration has since run into stronger political headwinds. Barriers are being 
threatened by recipient countries, despite ample evidence on the economic benefits 
of migration to them (Kahanec 2016). Research documents that immigrants alleviate 
skill shortages, enhance productivity through creation of new firms and industries, and 
lower prices for domestic consumers. There is, however, a lack of awareness of such 
benefits and also perception gaps about the extent of migration and the motivation of 
Labour mobility and the European Project
Davide Furceri and Prakash Loungani
103
migrants. In France, for instance, opinion polls suggest people think that immigrants 
make up almost 30% of the population, whereas the actual number is 10%. Similar 
misperceptions about the extent of migration are prevalent in other European countries. 
Moreover, a common characterisation of migrants is that they are motivated by the 
desire to receive welfare payments. Kahanec (2016) presents some evidence, however, 
that causality actually goes the other way – in areas with greater migration, there tends 
to be a policy response that leads to increases in welfare benefits, perhaps as an attempt 
to compensate any domestic workers who might be affected by migration.  
While migration faces political barriers, it is still worth touting the benefits of schemes 
(e.g. temporary worker programmes) that could help on the economic front without 
encountering stiff political opposition (Rodrik 2007). Labour mobility remains an 
important adjustment mechanism in the face of asymmetric shocks within a currency 
union and thus is important for the success of the European Project.
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sharing and coordination of 
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The euro area economy is currently performing remarkably well. But although several 
institutional changes have been introduced under the pressure of the sovereign debt 
crisis, the euro area’s architecture is widely considered to be in need of further reform. 
Recently, several proposals have been put forward that include fiscal risk sharing (e.g. 
Arnold et al. 2018, Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2018). According to some, the absence of 
decisive steps towards fiscal union even poses an existential threat to the currency 
union (Berger et al. 2018). The current economic situation may provide a good window 
of opportunity for further institutional reform. However, the political will among 
European policymakers to move towards a fiscal union seems to be rather limited (in 
part because some fear that it will lead to a permanent system of transfers). But Berger 
et al. (2018: 1) argue that “accepting political constraints as unchangeable will leave 
Europe ill-equipped to mitigate the harsh economic reality of a modern-day currency 
union operating in an environment of volatile international financial markets”. 
At the same time, several policymakers have argued in favour of better coordination of 
European monetary and fiscal policies. For instance, ECB President Draghi argued in 
his speech at Jackson Hole in 2014 that “[...] it would be helpful if fiscal policy could 
play a greater role alongside monetary policy, and I believe there is scope for this, 
while taking into account our specific initial conditions and legal constraints” (Draghi 
2014). Likewise, in the letter of intent accompanying Juncker’s 2016 State of the Union 
address, the President of the European Commission endorsed “a positive fiscal stance 
for the euro area, in support of the monetary policy of the European Central Bank”.
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In this chapter, we discuss what – in our view – are the key issues in the debate on 
fiscal risk sharing and the coordination of fiscal and monetary policy. Before turning 
to these issues in detail, it is important to first distinguish between idiosyncratic and 
common shocks. Idiosyncratic shocks are asymmetric in nature (i.e. not all member 
states of the currency union are affected by them), whereas common shocks hit all 
member states (although their transmission may be asymmetric). Euro area member 
states have foregone the possibility to adjust their exchange rates to mitigate the effects 
of idiosyncratic shocks. The question is how costly this loss in flexibility is and what 
can be done to compensate for it. Is some form of fiscal risk sharing needed? Common 
shocks, on the other hand, can, under normal circumstances, be countered by the 
monetary policy of the ECB. But now this policy is less effective as policy rates have 
reached the effective lower bound, the question is whether coordinated national fiscal 
policies can be of any help. 
Against this backdrop, we will review the case for (more) fiscal risk sharing and 
coordination of monetary policy and national fiscal policies in turn. 
Fiscal risk sharing
The case for more fiscal risk sharing in the euro area hinges on six considerations. 
First, risk sharing via financial markets is relatively underdeveloped in the euro area 
compared to other currency unions, such as the US (Alcidi et al. 2017). Furthermore, 
euro area financial markets are more debt-based than equity-based. And debt finance 
turns out to be much more pro-cyclical, in large part because its pay-offs lack the state 
contingency of equity-like flows (ECB 2016). Therefore, in bad economic times, when 
default risk is most prominent and investors’ risk appetite diminishes, firms find it most 
difficult to refinance their debts. This helps explain why market-based risk sharing 
within EMU collapsed during the recent crisis, exactly when it was most needed 
(Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 2014, Furceri and Zdzienicka 2015). 
Second, even if financial markets were complete (i.e. contracts are offered to insure 
for every possible state of the world), private risk sharing is still inefficiently low. As 
such, a role emerges for government intervention (Farhi and Werning 2017). The main 
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reason for this is that private investors do not internalise the (positive) macroeconomic 
stabilisation externalities of their portfolio choices. Accordingly, fiscal risk sharing is 
Pareto-improving.
Third, explicit fiscal risk sharing may reduce moral hazard compared to the current 
implicit bailout perceptions (Berger et al. 2018). Although there is a formal no-bailout 
rule, sovereigns in the currency union may rationally decide to support a fellow 
member state in financial distress. This is driven by the fact that the costs of default 
may be higher than those of a bail out. As financial markets understand this logic, they 
will fail to impose the discipline that averts moral hazard. However, the presence of a 
formal arrangement to share some fiscal risk may alter that cost-benefit calculation (see 
Berger et al. 2018 for the analytical underpinnings). This might be particularly so for 
(more) explicit fiscal risk sharing in the context of the Banking Union (i.e. the European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme and a common backstop for the Single Resolution Fund) 
as it reduces the ‘doom loop’. Whether it also holds for other proposed risk-sharing 
schemes like a macroeconomic stabiliszation fund (Arnold et al. 2018) or a European 
unemployment insurance scheme (Dullien 2014) is, however, less clear. 
Fourth, if fiscal risk sharing indeed alters governments’ default/bailout decision, 
sovereign default may be more likely. If so, financial markets may better impose fiscal 
discipline (i.e. demanding risk premia that are proportional to the intrinsic risk profile 
of the debtor). As such, the view that there is a trade-off between fiscal risk sharing and 
market discipline may be wrong. However, this hypothesis is in dire need of empirical 
support.
Fifth, if more market discipline is imposed, there may be less reliance on fiscal rules 
to enforce fiscal discipline. Up until now, these rules have been poorly complied with 
(this holds true for the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP); see de 
Haan et al. 2015) and inconsistently enforced. A more credible no-bailout clause, which 
enhances market discipline, would therefore be a move in the right direction. We are, 
however, under no illusion that with better market discipline, fiscal rules will become 
obsolete. In fact, they remain necessary as a backstop for markets reacting too much 
and/or too late. But discussing whether these rules should be the current ones or new 
ones, and how adherence to these rules should arranged, is beyond the scope of this 
contribution. 
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Finally, the case for (more) fiscal risk sharing ultimately hinges on the relevance of 
idiosyncratic shocks and the potency of national fiscal policy to stabilise these shocks. 
In their seminal paper, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) showed that only in a small 
core of current euro area member states were shocks highly synchronised, while in 
the periphery shocks were significantly less synchronised. However, following the 
same methodology, more recent research has shown that this pattern has weakened 
(Campos and Macchiarelli 2016). Bayoumi and Eichengreen (2017) even report that 
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Greece belong to the core of the euro area, where the 
core is defined as countries whose aggregate supply and demand shocks are relatively 
highly correlated with those of Germany.  This is consistent with evidence that business 
cycles have become more synchronised (De Haan et al. 2008, Campos et al. 2017). 
Gächter and Riedl (2014) even conclude that the adoption of the euro has increased 
the synchronisation of business cycles above and beyond the effect of higher trade 
integration.
In addition, the idiosyncratic shocks hitting euro area member states can be stabilised by 
national fiscal policies. Empirical estimates by Bayoumi and Masson (1995) suggest, 
for instance, that national fiscal policies in the euro area are able to perform a similar 
degree of stabilisation as fiscal transfer systems in the US and Canada. Likewise, more 
recent research by Dolls et al. (2012) suggests that a larger percentage of both income 
and unemployment shocks is absorbed by automatic stabilisers in the euro area than in 
the US, although the heterogeneity between member states is considerable. 
Coordination of monetary and national fiscal policies
Under normal circumstances, monetary policy is supposed to deal with common 
economic shocks in the euro area. But the policies of the ECB are currently running out 
of steam due to the fact that they are operating at the effective lower bound. Against this 
backdrop, Eggertson (2011), has shown that the effect of a government spending shock 
is much larger under the effective lower bound than under normal circumstances. This 
finding has recently been confirmed by Bonam et al. (2017). 
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However, fiscal policy in the euro area is implemented at the national level, rather 
than the central level. The mandate of national budgetary authorities is to adhere to 
national needs and wishes. Therefore, national fiscal policy doesn’t take the euro area 
output gap and spillover effects of national fiscal policy into account (Beetsma and 
Guliodori 2004 and Pogoshyan 2017 provide evidence for these spillovers). From a 
euro area perspective, failing to internalise these externalities leads to a suboptimal 
aggregate fiscal stance (Beetsma et al. 2001, Gali and Monacelli 2008). But that is not 
the only reason that European monetary and fiscal policies may be inconsistent. Even 
at the national level fiscal policy is often pro-cyclical, reflecting the unsustainable fiscal 
positions several member states had. It is therefore no wonder that the aggregate euro 
area fiscal stance and monetary stance are so often poorly aligned. As it turns out, since 
the start of EMU, both only complement each other in a little over 50% of the time 
(Figure 1). 
As such, much can be won by a policy effort to better align the euro area fiscal stance 
with the monetary stance. This, however, also requires better national fiscal discipline. 
At present, those member states that are most in need of fiscal expansion are generally 
not in the position to increase their indebtedness any further. In particular, building 
sufficient fiscal buffers in good economic times is therefore most necessary.
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Note: Grey shaded areas indicate periods in which the two policy stances share the same sign. Fisc HPEA: euro area fiscal 
stance calculated using the HP filtered output gaps;  Fisc PEA: euro area fiscal stance calculated using the output gaps from the 
production function approach; MonK: monetary stance based on Krippner’s (2013) shadow rates; MonWX: monetary stance 
based on Wu and Wia’s (2017) shadow rates. Figure provided by Nikki Panjer.
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Conclusions
The need for (more) fiscal risk sharing ultimately hinges on the relevance of idiosyncratic 
shocks and the potency of national fiscal policy to stabilise the effects thereof. In our 
view, if governments ensure sustainability of fiscal policy, they can use national fiscal 
policy to stabilise idiosyncratic shocks (which are probably less important than in the 
past anyway), preferably by using automatic stabilisers but, if needed, by discretionary 
policy. Under those conditions, fiscal risk sharing beyond that in the Banking Union 
is probably not needed. Coordination of monetary and national fiscal policies, on the 
other hand, may support the monetary policy of the ECB to stabilise common shocks. 
But again, this only is feasible after current levels of government debt have been 
reduced to sustainable levels. Our main conclusion therefore is that fiscal discipline is 
a necessary precondition for national fiscal policy to play a role in the stabilisation of 
both idiosyncratic and common shocks.
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15 Financial engineering will not 
stabilise an unstable euro area
Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji
London School of Economics and CEPR; University College London
The sovereign bond markets in the euro area are characterised by a fundamental 
instability. The source of this instability can be described as follows (see De Grauwe 
2011, De Grauwe and Ji 2013). National governments in a monetary union issue debt 
in a currency that is not their own, but is equivalent to a foreign currency. As a result of 
this lack of control over the currency in which the bonds are issued, these governments 
cannot guarantee that the bondholders will always be paid out at maturity. This 
contrasts with governments of countries issuing their own currency. These governments 
can give a full guarantee to the bondholders because they know that the central bank 
stands ready to provide liquidity in times of crisis. All this leads to a situation in which 
government bond markets in a monetary union can be hit by self-fulfilling crises: 
investors distrusting the capacity (or willingness) of a government to continue to 
service its debt sell the bonds, thereby raising the yields and making it more difficult 
for that government to rollover its debt. A liquidity crisis erupts which results from a 
fear that the government will be hit by a liquidity crisis. This usually happens during 
recessions when budget deficits and government debts increase automatically. Investors 
will then single out those governments perceived to be most at risk, sell their bonds, and 
acquire bonds issued by governments perceived to be less risky. As a result, massive 
capital flows across the borders of the monetary union are set in motion, destabilising 
the whole system. This is exactly what happened during the sovereign debt crisis of 
2010-12. 
The instability of the government bond markets in a monetary union is aggravated 
by a possible doom loop between the banks and the sovereign. When banks are in 
trouble, the sovereign that is obliged to save the banks will also be hit by a liquidity, 
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and possibly a solvency crisis. This was the problem for Ireland. The reverse can 
also happen: a sovereign debt crisis leads domestic banks, holding large amounts of 
domestic sovereign bonds, into illiquidity and insolvency (the Greek problem). The 
doom loop amplifies a sovereign debt crisis. That does not mean, though, that sovereign 
debt crises and the ensuing destabilising capital flows cannot erupt in the absence of a 
banking crisis. 
Can financial engineering cure this instability?  Recently, the European Systemic Risk 
Board proposed the creation of a ‘safe asset’ that, as is claimed by the authors, would 
eliminate the destabilising capital flows across the borders of the monetary union and 
thereby help to stabilise the system (ESRB 2018).  Will it do this? This is the question 
we now turn to. 
In contrast with earlier proposals to create Eurobonds (De Grauwe and Moesen 2009), 
Delpla and von Weizsäcker 2010), which assume that participating governments are 
jointly liable for the service of the national debts, the ‘safe asset’ proposal makes 
no assumption of joint liability. Instead, in this proposal national governments are 
individually liable for their own debt. There is no pooling of risks. 
The ‘safe asset’ is created when financial institutions (private or public) buy a portfolio 
of national government bonds (in the primary or in the secondary markets) and use 
this portfolio as a backing for their own issue of bonds, called ‘sovereign bond-backed 
securities’ (SBBSs). The latter have the following characteristics. 
• One tranche, the junior tranche, is risky. When losses are posted on the underlying 
portfolio of government bonds the junior tranche takes the hit.1 
• The second tranche, the senior tranche, is safe. 
The proponents of these SBBSs take the view that a 30% junior tranche is a large enough 
buffer to take potential losses on the underlying sovereign bonds so as to make the 
senior tranche (70%) risk-free. Based on simulations of some presumed risk patterns, 
the authors claim that their proposal will allow the size of safe assets in the euro area to 
be more than doubled. In addition, they claim that the existence of SBBSs will replace 
1 In the ESRB (2018) proposal, this tranche is split further into two tranches: a junior tranche proper with the highest risk 
(10%), and a mezzanine tranche (20%) which takes the losses after the junior tranche has been depleted.  
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the destabilising capital flows across national borders in the euro area by a movement 
from the risky asset (the junior tranche) into the safe asset (the senior tranche), thereby 
eliminating the instability in the euro area. 
How likely is it that these SBBSs will help to stabilise the euro area? Note that in the way 
we formulate the question we do not dispute that, in normal times, the creation of a safe 
asset may not increase the efficiency of the financial system in the euro area. It probably 
will do so by supplying a new type of asset that can provide for a better diversification 
of normal risks. The issue is whether the safe asset will be an instrument for dealing 
with systemic risks in times of crisis. Our answer is negative for the following reasons.
First, the creation of a safe asset does not eliminate the national government bond 
markets. This is recognised by the proponents of a safe asset (ESRB 2018, Brunnermeier 
et al. 2016). In fact, these proponents have made the continuing existence of national 
sovereign bond markets a key component of their proposals. According to the ESRB, 
“the SBBS issuance requires price formation in sovereign bond markets to continue to 
be efficient” (p. 33). The markets for sovereign bonds must remain large enough so as 
to maintain their liquidity. That is also why the ESRB proposes to limit the total SBBS 
issuance to at most 33% of the total outstanding stock of sovereign bonds. 
This constraint on the issue of SSBSs implies that national sovereign bond markets will 
be ‘alive and kicking’. As a result, the major problem that we identified earlier – the 
potential for destabilising capital flows across the borders of the monetary union – will 
still be present. However, since the markets of sovereign bonds will have shrunk, the 
yields are likely to be more volatile during crisis periods.
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Second, we observe that during crises, the correlation pattern of yields changes 
dramatically. During normal times all yields are highly positively correlated. During 
crisis times, as investors are looking for safe havens, the yields in the safe assets tend to 
decline sharply and become negatively correlated with the high-risk yields. This pattern 
was very pronounced during the sovereign debt crisis of 2010-12. In their simulations 
of the risks involved in SBBSs, Brunnermeier et al. (2016) do take into account the 
fact that risks can be correlated. However, this correlation pattern is fixed, while during 
crisis periods correlation patterns change dramatically. We show this feature in Table 1. 
We find that during the sovereign debt crisis of 2010-12, the government bond yields 
of the periphery countries under stress were highly positively correlated. At the same 
time, these yields were negatively correlated with the yields of the core (safe) countries 
(Germany, Finland, France, the Netherlands). 
The implication is that during crises it is very unlikely that the senior tranche in the 
SBBSs can maintain its status of safe asset. It will consist of bonds that investors dump 
and ‘safe-haven’ bonds. The senior tranche will continue to depend on the cash flow 
generated by bonds that panicking investors deem to be extremely risky. The perception 
that this senior tranche is equally safe as the safe-haven sovereign bonds (e.g. German 
bonds) is very unlikely when markets are in panic mode.  As a result, it is also likely 
that investors will flee the senior tranches of the SBBSs to invest in the ‘real thing’, i.e. 
super-safe sovereign national bonds. 
Conclusion
Stabilisation by financial engineering will not work. Real stabilisation of the euro area 
requires three mechanisms. The first is the willingness of the ECB to provide liquidity 
in the sovereign bond markets of the euro area during times of crisis. The ECB has set 
up its OMT programme to do this. However, OMT is loaded with austerity conditions, 
which will be counterproductive when used during recessions (which is when crises 
generally occur). That is why a second mechanism is necessary. This consists in creating 
Eurobonds that are based on joint liability of the participating national governments. 
Without such joint liability, it will not be possible to create a common sovereign bond 
market. The creation of such a common bond market is the conditio sine qua non for 
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long-term stability in the euro area. Finally, stabilisation of the euro area will also 
require completing the Banking Union so as to eliminate the doom-loop between the 
sovereign and the banks
The political willingness to create a budgetary union and a full Banking Union, 
however, is non-existent today. There is no willingness to provide a common insurance 
mechanism that would put taxpayers in one country at risk of having to transfer money 
to other countries. Under those conditions, the sovereign bond markets in the euro area 
will continue to be prone to instability, leading to instability in the banking systems of 
the euro area. 
The danger of financial engineering proposals is that they create a fiction allowing 
policymakers to believe that they can achieve the objective of stability by some technical 
wizardry without having to pay the price of a further transfer of sovereignty. 
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Sciences Po and CEPR
The starting point of the proposals made in the recent CEPR Policy Insight (Bénassy-
Queré et al. 2018) for the euro area’s fiscal architecture is that the present fiscal rules 
have failed. Despite several reform attempts, they have not worked well. In some 
countries, excessive public debts have accumulated because of banking crises and the 
Great Recession, but also because countries either did not abide by European fiscal 
rules or because the rules were not sufficiently stringent in good times. At the same 
time, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has constrained fiscal stabilisation policy 
during the euro area crisis of 2010-2013, contributing to the overburdening of the ECB.
The euro area crisis was not solely generated by fiscal issues (see Martin and Philippon 
2017) – public debt was not the main driver of the crisis and fiscal policy was not the 
only mismanaged policy during the crisis. However, there was a bias towards too lax a 
policy during the good years before the crisis and too much austerity during the crisis. 
This is one of the deficiencies that Bénassy-Queré et al. (2018) address. 
In a recent paper (Martin and Philippon 2017), my co-author and I analysed, in the 
context of the euro crisis, the role of fiscal policy in relation to household leverage 
and interest rate spreads (and therefore ECB policy). We build our analysis on a mix 
of theory – a model with financially constrained households, where fiscal policy is 
biased by political economy considerations and constrained by borrowing costs and 
spreads themselves are affected by past private and public borrowing, as well as bank 
recapitalisation needs and the possibility of euro breakup – and empirics – in particular, 
an identification strategy of the impact of expectations of a breakup of the euro area 
through a comparison with the US, where such a breakup was not at work. Focusing on 
Spain, Ireland, Greece, and Portugal – the four periphery countries that were hit hardest 
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by the crisis – we find that a drift in spending and in social transfers have characterised 
the fiscal rule of Greece in the boom years. This political economy bias in fiscal policy 
was also present, but to a lesser extent, in Ireland and Spain. 
We analysed several counterfactuals. First, we removed in these countries the political 
economy bias that was at work before the crisis. Figure 1 shows that for Greece, a 
more conservative fiscal policy during the crisis would have indeed stabilised GDP by 
reducing the boom and bust cycle. In this case, Greece would have entered the crisis 
with a much lower level of public debt, so that spreads would not have increased as 
much and it would not have been pushed so much into fiscal austerity. For the other 
three countries, the fiscal narrative is much less important. Indeed, for Spain and Ireland 
in particular, fiscal imprudence was not the main issue. 
An effective macroprudential framework, which would have constrained the private 
debt build-up, would have helped to reduce the boom-and-bust cycle more than fiscal 
prudence alone (see Figure 2) in these two countries. However, we show that in presence 
of a political economy bias, Spain and Ireland would, with an effective macroprudential 
framework, have increased their public debt. Macroprudential policies that do not come 
with a more prudent fiscal rule may not have been sufficient to generate a fiscally 
sustainable stabilisation of employment. In this sense, macroprudential policies 
to constrain private leverage and prudent fiscal policies to constrain public debt are 
complements, not substitutes. This is consistent with our policy recommendations 
in Bénassy-Queré et al. (2018), where we favour both stronger rules on the financial 
architecture and more effective fiscal rules. 
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Figure 1 Data and counterfactual with conservative fiscal policy in the boom 
a) Public debt     





































































Source: Martin and Philippon (2017).
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Figure 2 Data and counterfactual with macroprudential policy in the boom
a) Public debt     









































































Source: Martin and Philippon (2017).
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Figure 3 Data and counterfactual with “whatever it takes” in 2008 rather than 2012
a) Public debt     
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In another counterfactual in Martin and Philippon (2017), we ask the following 
question: what would have happened if the announcements of July 2012 (Mario 
Draghi’s “Whatever it takes” declaration) and September 2012 (the OMT programme) 
had come earlier, i.e. in 2008? These announcements were successful in reducing the 
risk of a euro breakup, financial fragmentation, and the sudden stop. In this case, all 
countries would have fared better in terms of GDP (not public debt) because spreads 
would not have exploded, and this would have reduced fiscal austerity during the crisis 
(see Figure 3). This also suggests that policy proposals that reduce the ‘doom loop’ 
between banks and sovereigns, and therefore the risk of a euro breakup with very large 
increases in spreads (that then push countries into fiscal austerity in a crisis), are key 
for the sustainability of the euro area. This is what we propose in Bénassy-Queré et al. 
(2018). This also means that a euro area where the ECB does not take into account the 
possibility of financial instability through self-fulfilling crises and does not act against 
it with a mix of strong commitments and actions, such as OMT, is not sustainable in the 
long term (Aguiar et al. 2015). 
This is the argument my co-author and I make in Farhi and Martin (2018), where we 
clarify the role of the ECB in the proposals in Bénassy-Queré et al. (2018). 
First, by allowing and facilitating debt restructuring inside the euro area as a last 
resort action in case of unsustainable sovereign debt, we make it easier to differentiate 
between a debt crisis due to redenomination risk and a debt crisis due to sustainability. 
Our proposals will reduce the financial and economic cost of a debt restructuring and 
the collateral damage of a sovereign debt restructuring, which must remain a last resort 
option inside the euro area. This collateral damage is the main reason we believe that 
flexible and responsible fiscal rules are necessary in the euro area – without constraints 
on fiscal policy, or with fiscal rules (like those present) that do not allow for effective 
macroeconomic stabilisation (in booms and busts), the risk is that the no-bailout rule 
loses credibility. In the situation where a country loses access to markets and expectations 
of a default or of a euro exit increase, creditor countries will find it less costly to bail out 
the country at risk rather than to let a messy default or exit unfold with a financial crisis 
and contagion costs to other countries. These contagion costs (Gourinchas et al. 2018) 
suggest that reducing the cost of sovereign default (in last resort but without euro exit) 
can both increase the credibility of the no-bailout rule (and therefore allow for more 
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effective market discipline) and allow for more fiscal flexibility because of more fiscal 
responsibility. This is the rational of the fiscal rules on expenditure growth that we 
propose in Bénassy-Queré et al. (2018), which allow for both more flexibility (the 3% 
deficit rule can be breached) and more responsibility (junior bonds to finance excessive 
public spending). This should also reduce the pressure on the ECB to intervene and 
the probability that the actions of the ECB stretch its legal mandate by morphing into 
partial bailouts for countries with unsustainable fiscal positions. 
Second, by weakening the ‘doom loop’ between banks and sovereigns through the 
introduction of concentration charges on sovereign debt, our proposals mitigate one of 
the key mechanisms that may catalyse self-fulfilling expectations of exit of financially 
fragile countries. 
Third, our proposals for a fiscal capacity to help countries in case of large negative 
shocks should also prevent a situation where the ECB is the sole institution with the 
possibility to provide macroeconomic stimulus. 
The fiscal architecture that we propose in Bénassy-Queré et al. (2018) is to be seen as a 
complement to, and not a substitute for, the other elements in particular on the financial 
architecture. In a situation where a fully integrated fiscal policy with a large euro area 
budget is not on the table in the near future, our proposals allow for both more risk 
sharing and solidarity, flexibility, and responsibility. 
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The debate about a reform of the architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) is intensifying as the EU is heading towards the June 2018 summit. The 
European Commission, the European Parliament, and several heads of state are aiming 
to decide on pressing reform questions before the electoral campaign for the European 
elections taking place in 2019 will start. Fiscal policy is the main concern of the current 
discussion. Not only is the Commission proposing additional resources for the EU 
budget, but also several initiatives – most prominently in several speeches by French 
president Emmanuel Macron – are pushing towards a fiscal union in EMU.
The discussion about a fiscal union is not new (Committee for the Study of Economic 
and Monetary Union 1989). The Commission has proposed it repeatedly in its desire to 
obtain more competencies and more funds. Traditional discussions between proponents 
of flexible and fixed exchange rates also considered the necessity of fiscal union. In 
particular, proponents of flexible exchange rates emphasised that a monetary union 
would not work without a fiscal union, whereas proponents of fixed exchange rates 
recognised the potentially disciplining effect of monetary union on national fiscal and 
economic policies (Feldsetin 1997, Beetsma and Giuliodori 2010). 
However, fiscal policies as well as labour market and social policies are prone to 
intensive distributive struggles. These distributional concerns must be solved politically 
by elected representatives who are controlled by the rule of law. Despite elections to the 
European Parliament, the EU is not a federal state, and neither is democratic and legal 
control sufficiently well-developed. During the discussions of a European constitution 
(which became the Lisbon Treaty), a fundamental criticism was the EU’s lack of a 
‘demos’, i.e. a European public such that European citizens are aware of the political 
proposals in different member states. A European demos implies that citizens look at 
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these political discussions not only from their national point of view, but also from 
a European point of view. Moreover, democratic control should be as intensive as in 
national electoral campaigns. The fate of Martin Schulz as leading candidate of the 
Social Democratic Party in Germany illustrates that the EU is far from achieving the 
intensity of national campaigns. 
A pragmatic analysis instead requires identifying the main shortcomings of the current 
EMU architecture. Don’t fix what ain’t broke – identify the main problems, consider 
the trade-offs that possible solutions entail, and aim at piecemeal social engineering. 
The main shortcoming of the EMU architecture
The main elements of the EMU architecture are the Europeanisation of monetary 
policy and national autonomy for fiscal and economic (including labour market and 
social) policies. National autonomy in fiscal and economic policies implies national 
responsibility. The no-bailout clause and the prohibition of monetary financing of 
national budgets are means to achieve this. Indeed, after the restructurings of Greek 
government debt in 2012, every creditor knows that default risk of government debt 
of EMU member countries exists. The Stability and Growth Pact only provides for a 
crutch that should help member states to arrive at solid fiscal and economic policies. It 
has not questioned the budgetary autonomy of member states in general.
During the euro crisis, it became obvious that the idea of national responsibility for 
fiscal policy even in the sense of debt restructuring is not sustainable unless the ‘doom 
loop’ between banks and sovereigns eases. Banks have incentives to hold debt of 
national sovereigns because there are no capital requirements or large exposure limits 
regarding public debt. The default of government debt would thus endanger the stability 
of the banking system, making a default less probable and in turn creating the incentive 
for banks to hold more government debt. Sovereigns have incentives to bail out banks 
if bank restructuring leads into a banking crisis and drains its possibilities to issue 
government bonds. Banks thus have incentives to incur higher risk in private credit 
markets. Excessive public and private debt are the consequences of this relationship 
between governments and banks (Feld et al. 2015, 2016). 
The need for a fiscal capacity
Lars P. Feld
137
The policy reaction during the euro crisis correctly addressed this problem through 
the creation of the Banking Union. Significant banks are supervised by the ECB’s 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), capital requirements for significant banks are 
increased and their possible restructuring is framed by the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM) establishing bail-in of banks’ creditors and a Single Resolution Fund (SRF) 
to provide liquidity in case of bank restructuring. The ECB serves as lender of last 
resort for solvent banks. It has also stabilised the euro through its Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) programme and quantitative easing (QE). The European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) offers credit lines for countries in a liquidity crisis in exchange for 
an adjustment programme framing the restructuring of government debt by requiring 
collective action clauses for government bonds. 
Regarding risk sharing when economic shocks affect member states differently, these 
policy solutions aim at facilitating private risk sharing between member states. Together 
with Capital Markets Union, Banking Union helps to establish a common credit market 
in Europe. The credit channel, together with risk sharing through factor markets (free 
flows of capital and labour), provide for by far the largest share of private risk sharing 
in existing federations (Feld and Osterloh 2013, Feld et al. 2018). In contrast, the 
European credit market is highly fragmented. 
However, as Farhi and Werning (2017) show, private risk sharing may be insufficient 
because investors in financial markets do not fully internalise the macroeconomic 
stability consequences of their portfolio decisions. There may thus be some role for fiscal 
policy in providing for risk sharing in the monetary union. Consider a banking crisis in 
one member state of EMU. If one bank’s refinancing difficulties induce contagion and 
affect other banks of that country, this may easily infect the whole European banking 
system. In such cases, the SRF can be quickly exploited such that a breakdown of the 
system can only be prevented if there is a fiscal backstop to the SRF. The introduction of 
such a fiscal backstop is necessary to complete Banking Union. Whether an additional 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) is also necessary depends on the design 
of the fiscal backstop to the SRF. Moreover, such a fiscal backstop should not provide 
incentives for moral hazard such that its introduction depends on preconditions such as 
a reduction of non-performing loans.
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The problems of fiscal union
A fiscal backstop must be understood as part of the Banking Union as it only sets 
in under certain conditions that originate in the banking system and its regulatory 
framework. Discussions about fiscal union instead consider a macroeconomic 
stabilisation facility that provides funds to member states in case of economic shocks 
and under certain conditions. Several proposals have been discussed, including a 
European finance minister with his or her own budget for macroeconomic stabilisation, 
a European Monetary Fund, a rainy-day fund with or without the possibility to issue 
debt, a European unemployment (re-)insurance scheme, and so on. These proposals 
differ in many respects, an important one being the allocation of competence (i.e. as 
part of the EU budget or as an element of the ESM). Given the difficulties of realising 
any of these proposals without treaty change, a new role for the ESM appears to be 
more probable. 
Without discussing these proposals in detail, it is obvious that each of the mechanisms 
induces strong moral hazard problems. Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2018) propose two 
options: (1) the introduction of a rainy-day fund (without debt issuance) providing 
reinsurance in case large shocks lead to large increases in the unemployment rate; 
and (2) a precautionary credit line of the ESM that a member state could access if 
it complies with ex ante conditionality (i.e. with fiscal rules) and has a strong policy 
record otherwise. The first mechanism rests on the fiction that the consequences of 
economic shocks are independent from labour or product market institutions, social 
policies, tax policies, and the like. However, shocks tend to be more severe the less 
flexible labour and product markets are (Blanchard and Wolfers 2000). Such a scheme 
would thus provide a premium for reform-reluctant member countries. The second 
scheme is problematic because it depends on the enforcement of ex ante conditionality. 
The track record of EMU member countries in complying with fiscal rules does not 
raise confidence that this scheme would work properly.
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Are we all fiscal now?
It seems that the debate about reform of the EMU architecture is obsessed with the desire 
for fiscal space. However, fiscal space in EMU is also a function of the fiscal space of 
member states. Consolidation of public finances in good times – i.e. now – increases 
fiscal space to fight future adverse economic shocks. In case of another severe banking 
crisis, a fiscal backstop of the SRF will serve the purpose of preventing the European 
banking system from breaking apart. The existing institutions, like the ESM or the 
mutated role of the ECB, provide for additional insurance against economic shocks in 
EMU. Fiscal policy competences of the EU should be introduced if its transition to a 
federation is completed. European policymakers should not repeat the mistake of taking 
the second step before the first.  
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and the euro experiment
Xavier Vives
IESE Business School and CEPR
The foundations laid in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 that opened the gate to the 
euro have proved flimsy. The Treaty established tight fiscal rules (a debt limit of 60% 
of GDP and a deficit limit of 3% of GDP) as well as a no-bailout clause according 
to which countries that got into trouble were on their own. The fiscal rules were to 
be implemented by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) of 1997 as well as several 
reinforcements to monitor its compliance that came afterwards. This design failed to 
provide stability to the euro and the sovereign debt crisis that started in 2010 put in 
danger the whole house until, in 2012, Banking Union was agreed and Mario Draghi 
stated that he would do “whatever it takes” to save the euro. The attempt to impose 
fiscal and market discipline had failed, with the SGP violated many times as well as 
the no-bailout clause as the ECB started to buy sovereign bonds to fend off the crisis. 
The origin of the failure to impose market discipline was out a fear of implosion of the 
European banking system when peripheral countries in the EU could not make good 
the debt they had with the banks of the central countries. There were no instruments to 
deal with sovereign insolvency crises in an orderly manner.
The euro area crisis was a ‘sudden stop’ crisis not so different from those of emerging 
economies (Baldwin and Giavazzi 2015). The cross-border capital flows from core to 
peripheral countries stopped, triggered by the subprime crisis, and hurt those countries 
running current account deficits. Lenders became suspicious about the viability of 
both peripheral sovereigns and banks. Both had deep links because governments were 
the lender of last resort of banks, and banks were in turn buying their sovereign debt. 
Governments could not devalue, and therefore the loans in euros were effectively 
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in a foreign currency and the euro area governments had no lender of last resort. To 
make matters worse (and in contrast to the US), the financing of the private sector was 
predominantly in the hands of banks.
In response to the crisis, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and Banking Union 
were created. The ESM was used to provide assistance to countries like Greece that 
needed a macroeconomic adjustment programme, or like Spain for bank recapitalisation. 
Banking Union has three pillars: the Single Supervisory Mechanism, with the ECB as 
main supervisor of banks in the euro area; the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), 
consisting of a Single Resolution Board (SRB) and Fund (SRF) to deal with banks in 
trouble; and the yet to be established European Deposit Insurance Scheme. Furthermore, 
the SRF does not yet have a proper backstop that can deal with a banking crisis. Both 
euro area-wide deposit insurance and the backstop are not yet established for good 
reason: they both entail a higher degree of risk sharing and fiscal integration than the 
status quo. At the same time, the ECB is questioned when buying sovereign bonds, 
since this action collides – at least in spirit – with the no-bailout clause in the Treaty.
How to stabilise the euro
There is a solution to stabilising the euro that is agreed on by the former finance 
ministers of both Germany and Greece, Wolfgang Schäuble and Yanis Varoufakis. 
This is political and fiscal union – transforming the euro area into the United States of 
Europe with a European budget, taxes, debt, and unemployment insurance. This would 
provide an euro area safe asset and a European Treasury, which would anchor the ECB. 
Unfortunately, this solution does not seem politically viable since it would imply that 
the current nation states completely relinquish their sovereignty. The US mutualised 
its debt and implemented a no-bailout clause on the states.  Can the market discipline 
solution work in a monetary union with no fiscal integration?
The SRM has been established, together with the Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (BRRD) that aims at ending bailouts by making bank equity and debtholders 
investors bear the costs of failure. As of January 2016, bail-in of 8% of a bank’s 
liabilities is required even under systemic stress, for example out of a macroeconomic 
shock. According to some views, the elimination of bailouts will permanently sever 
the link between banks and the sovereign in the euro area, and therefore the need for 
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fiscal union vanishes. Completing the Banking Union with an integrated but limited 
deposit insurance mechanism and resolution fund would be enough. However, given a 
macroeconomic shock such as the one derived from the subprime crisis and subsequent 
sovereign debt crisis, a bailout may be needed to prevent systemic institutions from 
failing and contaminating other institutions and the whole economy. Indeed, under 
the present rules, uninsured wholesale funding (junior to retail) would withdraw 
immediately at the first sign of trouble. In fact, the evolution of bail-in in practice 
did proceeded in a consistent way through 2017, as the cases in Italy make clear. The 
credibility of the procedure is at stake. It is necessary, then, to have a sufficient backstop 
in the resolution fund and a resolution procedure that accounts for systemic problems. 
A case in point is the success of the TARP programme in the US in stemming the 2007-
09 crisis by providing capital to systemic entities, which by now has been paid back. 
Furthermore, even the lender-of-last-resort function of the euro area system of central 
banks is limited when resolving an entity in that emergency liquidity assistance is in 
the hands of the national central bank with strict collateral rules. It could well be that an 
illiquid but solvent bank does not get the needed assistance to confront a liquidity crisis.
Lacking the extreme solutions – pure market discipline with no lender of last resort and 
full integration – the game is to find hybrid solutions in which countries partially cede 
sovereignty to provide sufficient risk sharing and at the same time maintain market 
discipline in order to control moral hazard. Here we have already witnessed a tension 
between France pushing for more risk sharing and Germany worrying about moral 
hazard (Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2018).
The need for an international lender of last resort and a 
European Monetary Fund 
When countries can suffer runs on their sovereign debt, and in particular when the 
debt is denominated in a foreign currency, the presence of an international lender of 
last resort may be required to avoid self-fulfilling crisis and excessive liquidation of 
entrepreneurial projects (Gale and Vives 2002). This is much like the need for a lender 
of last resort for banks to avoid situations where the bank becomes illiquid despite 
being solvent. The classical prescription is due to Bagehot and consists of unrestricted 
lending to solvent but illiquid banks with the backing of good collateral and at a 
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penalty rate. In order to improve welfare, however, the lender of last resort facility 
must be complemented with an orderly failure resolution facility that provides help to 
restructure barely insolvent banks when the moral hazard problem is moderate, and 
a prompt corrective action facility that intervenes for barely solvent banks when the 
moral hazard problem is severe. The same applies to countries. An international lender 
of last resort can avoid sovereign debt panics at the same time as it imposes discipline 
by restructuring policies in an early intervention when the danger of moral hazard is 
high, or by providing help to restructure debt when the country is barely insolvent and 
the danger of moral hazard moderate (Rochet and Vives 2004).
The question is whether the IMF can play such a role or whether the euro area needs a 
European Monetary Fund (EMF). President Juncker has formalised the proposal for an 
EMF recently. The Fund would be the heir to the ESM, with agile decision making in 
the face of a crisis as a European institution not requiring unanimity for all decisions. 
The EMF would provide the backstop to the SRF and would act as lender of last 
resort to banks in resolution. It would continue to help countries with debt-financing 
problems with new financial instruments.  The argument in favour of the IMF lies in 
taking seriously the no-bailout clause of the Treaty and in having a tough, politically 
independent institution to manage debt restructuring when needed. The argument in 
favour of the EMF lies in providing one necessary component to build the sufficient 
amount of risk sharing while keeping market discipline for the euro area to survive. 
The EMF, together with the ECB, could implement the optimal design of an 
international lender of last resort for the euro area in the following way. The EMF 
would have responsibility for liquidity and solvency problems of countries. Liquidity 
help to sovereigns by the EMF would allow the ECB to concentrate on liquidity help 
to banks in need and monetary policy open market operations. The ECB itself should 
carry the Emergency Liquidity Assistance function. An orderly failure resolution 
and prompt corrective action mechanisms at the EMF would control moral hazard, 
as suggested by Rochet and Vives (2004). The orderly failure resolution mechanism 
would help sovereigns in trouble that are in good standing to recover and put them on a 
sustainable fiscal path. A European sovereign debt restructuring mechanism would deal 
with insolvency as last ratio, together with a reform of the regulation of the sovereign 
exposures of banks (with appropriate risk weights and concentration limits). The EMF 
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should have early intervention capabilities that allow the institution to implement 
prompt corrective action policies for sovereigns that are barely solvent and heading for 
trouble. For this, the EMF would need supervisory powers. The EMF would provide the 
fiscal backstop to the SRF; it would need decision taking by qualified majority; and to 
operate as a European institution to improve accountability and legitimacy.1 A further 
reform of the financial regulatory architecture would be to merge the future European 
deposit insurance fund with the SRF and manage it via a unified deposit insurance 
and resolution board like the FDIC in the US, as proposed in the early Banking Union 
proposal by Vives (1992).2
The establishment of the EMF with the mentioned parameters would constitute an 
essential component for stabilising the euro and would imply an increase in the degree 
of fiscal integration. 
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The euro area needs balanced reforms that combine more risk sharing with stronger 
market discipline. A key reason for political resistance to reform is a lack of trust both 
between member states and in European institutions. At the same time, the weaknesses 
of the status quo and the costs of no reform are underestimated. Successful common 
undertakings in policy areas other than the euro may help to build trust and make 
progress in euro area reforms as well. 
Euro area reform needs to combine risk sharing and market 
discipline
The euro area has survived the euro crisis but it continues to be fragile. As a currency 
union of sovereign states, it faces a number of challenges countries with national 
currencies do not face. While financial stability and resilience to economic shocks 
requires risk sharing across countries, hard budget constraints and sufficient incentives 
for sound economic and fiscal policies need to be preserved. Can these two objectives 
be achieved? In the debate about possible directions for reform, there are two opposing 
views on this. 
The first view is pessimistic and claims that achieving these two objectives simultaneously 
is impossible. This view implies that Europe needs to choose between two extremes: 
either the euro area needs to be transformed into some kind of quasi federal system, or 
it will never be much more than a fixed exchange rate system (Stiglitz 2016) which will 
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fall apart sooner or later. The federal solution would require the creation of a federal 
euro area government with the right to tax and issue debt, following the model of the 
US. This would be a fundamental change in the constitutional setup of the EU.
I call this view pessimistic because it effectively implies that the euro cannot survive. At 
least for the foreseeable future, the populations of the member states would not support 
a massive transfer of sovereignty to a European federal government. Claiming that the 
European Currency Union can only survive if underpinned by a federal political union 
is equivalent to claiming that it is doomed.  
The second, more optimistic view is that the euro area can work as a currency union of 
sovereign member states if common institutions are created which provide a balance 
between risk sharing and market discipline (Bénassy-Queré et al. 2018). Here the 
assumption is that certain, mostly technocratic tasks and functions can be delegated 
to common institutions like the ECB, but the ultimate responsibility for economic and 
fiscal policy will remain at the level of the member states, as will democratic control 
of these policies.
The original architecture of the euro area – with its focus on fiscal rules, the no-
bailout clause and the prohibition of monetary financing of public spending – was in 
line with this approach. However, it proved to be inappropriate in practice because its 
institutional architecture was incomplete. This became evident long before the euro 
crisis. The fiscal rules and the governance framework of the Stability and Growth Pact 
were unable to effectively constrain the economic and fiscal policy of the member 
states. The interdependence between banks and public finances was neglected, and 
when the crisis came, the downturn in the euro area was severe and the no-bailout rule 
was circumvented, mainly because the risks associated with its application under the 
circumstances prevailing at the time of the crisis were considered too large.
Since the crisis, several measures have been taken to improve the ability of the euro 
area to deal with economic shocks and crises. This includes the creation of the ESM 
and the first steps towards a European Banking Union. But these steps are not enough. 
The current institutional setup provides neither enough stability in the event of crises 
nor sufficient incentives for sound economic and fiscal policies. Government debt in 
the euro area is much higher than before the crisis, which means that there will be 
much less fiscal space to respond to the next crisis when it comes. The financial nexus 
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between banks and national governments is still strong. Deposit insurance continues 
to be national and the European bank resolution fund (the Single Resolution Fund, or 
SRF) is large enough to deal with crises of individual banks, but too small to confront 
a systemic crisis. 
The no-bailout rule is not credible because banks continue to hold large amounts of 
domestic government debt. Applying the no-bailout rule – that is, restructuring the debt 
of insolvent member states – would trigger a banking crisis with high costs for the 
rest of the economy. Therefore, policymakers will shy back from applying the rule 
even in cases where government debt is unsustainable. Since investors in international 
capital markets know that the no-bailout rule is not fully credible, in particular not 
in the case of larger member states, they will lend carelessly to these countries, at 
artificially low interest rates. This destroys incentives for sound economic policies and 
fiscal consolidation in good times.
Why is it so difficult to agree on reforms?
The basic idea that the euro area needs reforms that combine improved risk sharing with 
improved incentives for sound policies and harder budget constraints is shared widely. 
Nevertheless, finding agreement about concrete reform steps is proving to be difficult. 
Why is this the case? One issue is that euro area reform debates often portray risk 
sharing and market discipline as substitutes. This is misguided. It is certainly true that 
risk-sharing mechanisms may undermine incentives. But as emphasized in Bénassy-
Queré et al. (2018), adequately designed institutions for risk sharing and institutions 
to foster market discipline may also be complementary. The no-bailout clause will 
only be credible if there is a degree of risk sharing that cushions the consequences of 
restructuring government debt. For instance, more diversification in the government 
debt holdings of banks would reduce the costs of debt restructuring and would therefore 
improve market discipline. One way of achieving more diversified government debt 
holdings, among others, would be to introduce a ‘European Safe Asset’ as proposed by 
Brunnermeier et al. (2011). 
Bretton Woods, Brussels and Beyond: Redesigning the Institutions of Europe
154
The lack of trust
The failure to take into account the complementarity between risk sharing and risk 
reduction or market discipline is not the only reason, and probably not even the main 
reason, for resistance against euro area reform, though. The most important obstacle is 
a lack of trust between member states, as well as a lack of trust in European technocratic 
institutions. The European Safe Asset proposal is a good example.
From the perspective of those who want to improve the credibility of the no-bailout 
clause, the European Safe Asset should be considered a good idea, provided that the 
rules are respected: only private institutions issue the European Safe Asset, the ECB 
does not intervene in the market for the junior tranche, banks cannot hold the junior 
tranche without appropriate equity underpinning, there are no public guarantees for the 
European Safe Asset, the price at which national governments sell their bonds to the 
institutions issuing the safe asset is determined in the market, and so on. The credibility 
of the no-bailout rule would be enhanced because the existence of the safe asset will 
reduce exposure of banks to sovereign risk. Public debt restructuring would only hit the 
junior tranche, and this tranche would be held by investors who are prepared to absorb 
losses. As a result, market discipline would be stronger.
Despite these properties, the European Safe Asset idea has been rejected even by 
countries that favour more market discipline. The reason is that there is little trust in 
the reliability of the rules (e.g. Scientific Advisory Board to the German Ministry of 
Finance 2017). Clearly, in a crisis scenario where the yields on the junior tranche may 
be high or the markets may freeze, political pressure to intervene politically will grow. 
The ECB might argue that the transmission mechanism does not work properly if trade 
in junior bonds comes to a halt. Another justification for intervention could be that there 
is market failure or ‘denomination risk’ in the market for the junior tranche. As a result, 
the safe asset would become a vehicle for introducing debt mutualisation ‘through the 
back door’. 
Similar issues play a role when it comes to the proposal to develop the ESM into a 
European Monetary Fund (EMF). The current intergovernmental structure of the ESM 
implies that there is a strong influence of the national governments, in particular of 
large countries like Germany, who have veto power. In the case of ESM programmes, 
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this easily leads to confrontational debates between creditors and debtors such as those 
between Greece and Germany in the summer of 2015. Transforming the ESM into an 
EMF enshrined in EU law would offer opportunities. It could reduce political conflicts 
between member states and bring about more acceptance for assistance programmes 
and their conditionality. It may even offer a more neutral assessment of government 
debt sustainability and thus put adjustment programmes on a better basis, provided 
that this assessment is shielded from political influence by either national governments 
or European political institutions. However, trust in the ability of a more ‘European’ 
institution to run assistance programmes more effectively is limited. For instance, in 
their letter about euro area reform, eight Northern European countries1 have argued that 
the ESM should “possibly” be transformed into an EMF but that “[d]ecision making 
should remain firmly in the hands of Member States”. The same letter states that “…
it is of the essence that we do our utmost...to regain public trust…” and concludes 
that “priority should be given to areas with the greatest convergence of views between 
Member States”. Clearly, the appetite to create new European institutions and trust that 
they will make the right choices for the whole of Europe is limited. This may partly be 
driven by the interest of national governments to preserve their influence and power, but 
a lack of trust in European institutions plays an important role.
To some extent, this lack of trust is a result of the euro crisis. This is mirrored in 
survey data about trust of the population of different countries in European institutions, 
illustrated by Figure 1.2 Unsurprisingly, the largest decline in trust occurred in Greece. 
But levels of trust have even declined in countries where the direct economic impact of 
the crisis in terms of employment or economic growth was less severe.
1 See here.
2 One should note that trust in national institutions also declined during the crisis. 
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Figure 1 Percentage of people expressing trust in the EU in 2007 vs the difference 
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Source: EEAG (2018). 
Implications for euro area reform
What does the decline of trust in European institutions imply for euro area reform? 
First, trust grows with the experience of successful common undertakings (EEAG 
2018). There is agreement that policy areas like defence, border protection, migration, 
the border crossing infrastructure network, as well as research and education offer huge 
opportunities for common activities that add value over and above what individual 
member states can achieve. If Europe is able to make progress in these policy areas, the 
impact on euro area reform can only be positive. But this process will take time, and 
doing nothing until trust has grown would be risky. 
Second, it is important to remind the public in all member states that the status quo 
has significant disadvantages. Simply relying on the existing institutional setup may 
be imprudent. It is likely that the next crisis will again lead to capital flight from the 
most affected countries, with the effect that the cost of the crisis will be higher than 
necessary. Since nothing has been done to reduce the cost of public debt restructurings, 
pressures will be high to bail out countries even if their fiscal position is unsustainable. 
If a large country like Italy is unable to stabilise and eventually reduce its public debt 
in the years to come, pressure on the ECB, and maybe also among decision makers 
in the ECB, will be strong to buy more and more Italian government bonds, a process 
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which could undermine the independence of monetary policy further and lead to severe 
political conflicts between member states. Reforms with a balanced combination of 
improved risk sharing and more market discipline offer at least the chance to reduce 
the cost of the next crisis significantly. All of this implies that the cost of doing nothing 
is large. 
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Conventional wisdom holds that a main constraint to reforming the European 
project is not a shortage of ideas or of tools, but a lack of priorities. To put it 
differently, economists have discussed extensively what to do and how, but 
have been broadly silent on who and when. Which institutions and rules 
are needed, and when? This eBook shows that such institutional questions, 
although seldomly raised, are of fundamental importance for the future 
of European integration. The individual chapters distil the lessons from the 
institutional framework underpinning Bretton Woods and the globalisation 
wave that followed it. For example, and accounting for its prominence, 
we ask whether a European Monetary Fund is sufficient or whether other 
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